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THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMBALANCE
RICHARD ALBERT*
I. INTRODUCTION
The modem American judiciary bears little resemblance to the institution created
by the Founding Fathers at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Alexander
Hamilton-a leading spokesperson for the Federalist forces that emerged victorious
from the founding debates-famously predicted that thejudiciary would be the least
dangerous of the three branches of government. We know now that Hamilton and
the Federalists were wrong on this forecast. We also know that the Anti-Federalists
were right. Indeed, the Anti-Federalists-an influential group of American founding
statesmen who withheld their assent from the Constitution for various reasons correctly presaged the future path of the American judiciary.
Contemporary thinkers have echoed the cautionary words of the Anti-Federalists,
arguing that the modern American judiciary has upset the constitutional balance that
sustains the American project of democracy. According to one scholar, the judiciary
has freely inserted itself into the political thicket, eroding the political question
doctrine that once ensured that the voice of the people would be heard.2 According
to another scholar, the judiciary has mooted popular discourse on important issues
of conscience before those deliberations have even begun to bud. 3 Still another
argues that the judiciary has commandeered public institutions to substitute the
people's judgment with its own.4 These and other increasingly frequent detours
* J.D., B.A., Yale University. I have benefited from discussions with several friends on the role and
function of the American judiciary, several of whom have commented on previous drafts of this Article, including
Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, John Baker, Jack Balkin, Rachel Barkow, Mijha Butcher, Dennis Coyle, Drew
Days, Steve Gold, Lino Graglia, Shelby Guilbert, Paul Horwitz, Bob Kokta, Ethan Leib, Ryan McLeod, Peter
Meyers, Alex Nguyen, Larry Obhof, Brandon Paradise, Stephen Presser, Jay Readey, Ronald Rotunda, Michael
Soules, Elizabeth Stauderman, Elisabeth Steele, Joe Tadros, Seth Tillman, Mark Tushnet, John Tuskey, Daniel
Walfish, and Russell Weaver. I am also grateful to the terrific team of editors at the New Mexico Law Review,
particularly to Barry Berenberg, Seth McMillan, Deana Bennett, and Jennifer Settle for shepherding this Article
through the editorial process.
1. See, e.g., Carl A. Auerbach, Is Government the Problem or the Solution?, 33 SAN DIEGOL. REV. 495,
497 (1996) ("[Tlhe Anti-Federalists, who opposed ratification, argued for a state-centered federalism."); Frederick
Mark Gedicks, The "Embarrassing"Section 134,2003 BYUL. REV. 959,966-67 ("The anti-Federalists opposed
the Constitution because it left natural rights without explicit textual protection, and there are strong historical
arguments that various clauses of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were understood at the time they were
enacted to recognize or refer to unenumerated rights, including natural rights."); Robert G. Natelson, A Reminder:
The ConstitutionalValues ofSympathy and Independence, 91 KY. L.J. 353, 388 (2002) ("Anti-Federalists opposed
the new Constitution in part because they believed it would foster dependence."); Jane Rutherford, The Myth of
Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1992) ("Indeed, the anti-federalists opposed the Constitution partly because
they feared the power of the federal courts to interpret it."); William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling,
Prospective Overruling and the Revival of "Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902, 1942 (1993)
("Anti-Federalists, for example, opposed the Constitution in part on the grounds that its flexibility and purported
ability to adapt to the future was a weakness, not a strength. They claimed that the dead hand control that the
Constitution represented would unfairly burden future generations; better to have a time-bound constitution that
would be repealed, rather than one that sought to constrain governmental decision-making for all time."); Sol
Wachtler, Judgingthe Ninth Amendment, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 597,600 (1991) ("The anti-federalists seized upon
the omission of a bill of rights as a reason to oppose the ratification of the Constitution.").
2. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine and the
Rise of JudicialSupremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002).
3. LAURENCE H. TRIE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 7 (1990) (stating that abortion was
"snatched from the political dueling ground by the Court's 1973 Roe decision").
4. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4-5 (1980); see also
MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING
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from the properjudicial course have raised a fundamental question in the separation
and distribution of constitutional powers: arejudicial encroachments into the public
square consistent with American popular sovereignty? As a matter of American
political theory, the answer is no.5
In these pages, I do not call for an end to judicial review, as Mark Tushnet does
in his compelling work that merits an audience from those committed to the
integrity of the judicial boundary.6 Instead I propose mechanisms to restore balance
to the American Constitution-a balance that scholars agree has been disturbed by
the American judiciary. These mechanisms are to be read alongside other
suggestions for limiting the ever-expanding judicial sphere of influence on issues
of policy.7 The ultimate objective of this Article is to reclaim for the legislature-as
the American Founders had envisioned-its central role in shaping matters of public
policy and reflecting the will of the American people. 8
Judicial lawmaking is vulnerable to the broad criticism that it is fundamentally
undemocratic insofar as it does not trace its source to the people themselves, to their
will as expressed through the legislature. But this criticism is itself subject to a
three-fold rebuttal: (1) legislative lawmaking is not the archetype of popular
government; (2) courts enhance the democratic process; and (3) courts reflect and
respond to public opinion. 9 Maybe so. But even if courts were able to accurately
gauge the pulse of the people, they should refrain from doing so precisely because
courts were designed to be shielded from the pressures of politics.'0 Activistjudicial
lawmaking amplifies the power of the judiciary, weakens the voice of the people,
and frustrates the promise of popular sovereignty."

AMERIcAN SocIETr

120 (1994) ("[TIhe Supreme Court must not sit as a super-legislature and...unelected justices
must not substitute their views for the judgments of the people's elected representatives.").
5. Let me be eminently clear that the views in these pages are limited to the American context. My
observations should in no way be understood or extrapolated as a prescription for reworking the institutional
relationships among the people, judiciary, and legislature in other countries and jurisdictions.
6. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
7. E.g., STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION (1994) (concluding with suggested

constitutional amendments to return the Constitution to the people); Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional
Interpretation,50 DUKE L.J. 1335 (2001) (proposing legislative constitutional interpretation as an attractive
alternative to judicial supremacy); Jonathan T. Molot, PrincipledMinimalism: Restriking the Balance Between
Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles,90 VA. L. REV. 1753 (2004) (advancing the theory of principled
minimalism on the judiciary); Mark Tushnet, Non-JudicialReview, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 453 (2003) (suggesting
three models of non-judicial institutions performing constitutional review); see also Seth Barrett Tillman, A
Textualist Defense ofArticle 1,Section 7, Clause3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided,and Why
INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1368 (2005) (offering evidence in support of the
proposition that the judiciary should not enjoy "near tyrannical monopoly of constitutional interpretation").
8. It is exceedingly important to note that theories of popular will-in particular those arguing that an act
of the legislature is the best reflection of popular will-often fail to account for what one scholar calls "knowledge
burdens on the electorate." Ilya Somin, PoliticalIgnorance and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty: A New
Perspective on the Central Obsession of ConstitutionalTheory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1297 (2004). This refers
to the degree of familiarity with the issues that citizens must possess in order to competently express their will to
their elected representatives. Id.
9. Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice?Reconciling UniversalJurisdictionwith DemocraticPrinciples,
92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1093-94 (2004). But see Larry J. Obhof, Rethinking JudicialActivism and Restraint in State
School FinanceLitigation, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 569, 595 (2004) ("There is little reason to believe that
courts are either more in touch with voters' views or more capable of formulating sound public policy decisions
than the other branches of government.").
10. Marc A. Fajer, With All DeliberateSpeed? A Reply to ProfessorSunstein, 70 IND. L.J. 39,42 (1994).
11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 208-11 (1985).

Winter 2007]

CONSTITUTIONAL IMBALANCE

This is not an argument for majoritarianism. 12 Quite the contrary, this view is
entirely in keeping with the first conceptions of thejudiciary, which was envisioned
as an agent of the people.13 Nor do I wish to compromise the elemental doctrine of
judicial independence, which is primordial in a liberal democracy.14 But judicial
independence from popular will should not descend into judicial supremacy over
popular will. 5 Democratic legitimacy can come only from freely given popular
consent expressed through an elected legislature. To believe that political judgments
should be clothed in that legitimacy is quite different from arguing that a majority
of an elected legislature is sufficient to legitimize all political judgments. My claim
on this point is simple: the action of a democratically elected legislature is the best
reflection of popular will.' 6
The unifying theme of this piece-the promise of the American project of
democracy is popular participation in public discourse-is echoed in a rich
literature. 7 My approach differs, though, in the remedy. I suggest expanding the
range of the legislative function in order to moderate the disproportionate force of
the judiciary in the American polity. In addition to this legislative expansion,
moving concurrently toward a more judicious practice of judicial review that
kindles and nurtures-rather than obstructs and ultimately extinguishes-will make
real the prospect of popular engagement in the public discourse. The focus of this
Article is to explore the use of several constitutional devices in the service of
popular democracy so as to reassert the paramount role of the legislature in
reflecting the public will. I will begin, in Part II, by reviewing the judicial function,
specifically the duties that steer the work of the American judiciary. In Part Ill, I
will survey the existing imbalance in the American constitutional process,
underscoring the inequitable influence of the judiciary in the American republic,
something the Federalists-but not the Anti-Federalists-had utterly not foreseen
at the founding.
In Part IV, I will explore three strategies for restoring balance to the American
constitutional order: (1) reinstating the Council of Censors, an artifact of the British
colonial era through which the people could articulate their views on important
matters of the day; (2) restoring the Council of Revision, an analogue of the Council
of Censors that sanitized legislation before the bill was given force and effect; and

12. Indeed, the American Constitution is anchored in principles of republican-not
majoritarian-govemment. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government...."); see also James Morton Smith, Liberty and Learning, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 53, 55 (1987) ("Moreover, the members of the Convention were interested not only in establishing
a republican government at the federal level, but also in finding 'a republican remedy for the diseases most incident
to republican government,' as Madison phrased it." (footnote omitted)).
13. Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 415 (2003).
14. Robert M. Howard & Henry F. Carey, Is an Independent JudiciaryNecessary for Democracy?, 87
JUDICATURE 284 (2004).
15. Steven H. Goldberg, Putting the Supreme Court Back in Place: Ideology, Yes; Agenda, No, 17 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 192-93 (2004).
16. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The ChangingStructure of Legitimacy in Statutory nterpretation,
108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1995).
17. See, e.g., ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004); CASS R. SuNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); BRUCE ACKERMAN,

WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Foreword:Traces
of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
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(3) importing a Canadian mechanism known as a non-obstante clause, which
authorizes the legislature to suspend the application of a judicial decision. Part V
will conclude, arguing that although the three options canvassed in Part IV are
appealing insofar as they confer upon the people final decision-making authority on
the meaning of the Constitution when it takes the shape of public policy, each of the
three strategies would disrupt the tripartite balance envisioned in the Constitution.
On the other hand, a fourth option-judicial minimalism-could conceivably offer
an effective resolution to the current imbalance in the American polity. But it, too,
is unequal to the task. Judicial minimalism holds great promise for the American
project of democracy, but it demands uncommon restraint from the American
judiciary, an optimistic vision that history has exposed as no more than whimsy.
II. THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
The judiciary occupies a well-settled function in the continuing constitutional
discourse among the three branches of government-the executive, the judiciary,
the legislature-and the people-from whom each branch of government derives
its authority to govern. "To decide cases" is how the late Justice Byron White
described the task of the court.'8 More specifically, the role of the judiciary is to
resolve private and public disputes as the final arbiter of questions of federal
statutory and constitutional law.19 Two duties fall under this expansive umbrella:
(1) to protect the Constitution and the principles of democracy; and (2) to create
law, both20 through the common law approach and the construction of duly enacted
statutes.
A. JudicialDuties
These two duties are at once complementary and contradictory. They are
complementary to the extent that defending the Constitution and the very fabric of
democracy demands the license to craft and command rules that govern civil
society. They are contradictory insofar as the former duty requires the judiciary to
adopt a reactive posture--defending the rights and liberties preserved in the
constitutional text from public or private infringement-while the latter invites the
court to assume an active role in the engineering of the state.
In order to fulfill the first of its duties-namely to protect the Constitution and
the principles of democracy-the judiciary leans on its power of judicial review,
long enshrined since Marbury v. Madison.2' Despite potent criticism to the
contrary, 22 judicial review falls squarely within the delegated power of judges.232
18. Dennis J. Hutchinson, Two Cheersfor JudicialRestraint:Justice White and the Role of the Supreme
Court, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (2003) (quoting DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS
WHIZZER WHrrE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 331 (1998)).

19. William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 14 (1986).
20. Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term: Foreword:A Judge on Judging:The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REV. 16, 27-29, 36 (2002).
21. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
22. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT (1977); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the CaseAgainstJudicialReview, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
23. Saikrisha B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Originsof JudicialReview, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 887, 915-16
(2003) ("[Tlhe government can exercise only that power which the people have delegated to it. A written
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Insisting otherwise misconstrues the text, structure, and history of the Constitution,
not to mention the original intent of its drafters and ratifiers.24 In discharging the
second of its duties-to create law-the judiciary will typically issue a decision
whose effect is to expand or curb rights and liberties as the court believes is dictated
by the circumstances of the particular legal dispute. This is the inevitable result of
the marriage uniting the common law tradition with an enthusiastic embrace of
judicial review.
B. JudicialReview
Judicial review-the practice of invalidating statutes and administrative acts as
violative of the Constitution-2 5-has worked a significant harm on the democratic
soul of the American citizenry. Each time the American judiciary has rendered a
judgment that fails to promote popular engagement in the public discourse or has
decided a case in a way that short circuits public deliberation, the court has in the
same breath cast yet another stone against the founding hope for participatory
democracy. The fateful consequence of this escalating habit of injudicious review
is to keep the people from occupying a formative role in the constitutional process
and to risk descending American democracy into juristocracy. 26 Though it remains
the acknowledged province of the judiciary to elaborate the meaning of the United
States Constitution,27 the deed to the text belongs neither to the Supreme Court nor
to the Congress but instead to the people.
Let me be clear. Judicial review is an accepted practice securely moored in the
embryonic years of the American constitutional tradition.28 Indeed, the power of
judicial review was not new to the Founders: the English Privy Council had
occasionally exercised similar license.29 Even the Anti-Federalists understood that
the Constitution bestowed upon the judiciary the power to invalidate legislative
enactments.3 ° Moreover, one of the contemporary justifications for judicial

constitution serves to codify these powers. Any exercise of authority beyond the grant of power in the written
constitution therefore is illegal, because it goes beyond the delegation from the people and undermines popular
sovereignty... .Nothing in the Constitution directs judges to treat nullities-unconstitutional statutes-as if they
were valid laws. Hence vindicating the people's choice of a limited Constitution requires judges to refuse to enforce
unconstitutional statutes.").
24. See generallyid. (arguing that judicial review does not find its origin in the rule of Marbury, but instead
in the text and structure of the Constitution, as understood by its drafters and ratifiers).
25. Ran Hirschl, Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial Review vs.
Democracy in ComparativePerspective,34 U. RICH. L. REV. 415,420-21 (2000) (reviewing TUSHNET, supranote
6).
26. See generallyRAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004) (describing the increasing prominence of courts in democratic constitutionalism).

27. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819) ("In considering this question, then, we
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.").

28. See Robert Justin Lipkin, ConstitutionalRevolutions: A New Look at Lower Appellate Review in
American Constitutionalism,3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 11-12 (2001).
29. Kenneth Einar Himma, Making Sense of ConstitutionalDisagreement: Legal Positivism, the Bill of
Rights, and the ConventionalRule of Recognition in the United States, 4 J.L. Soc'y 149, 204 (2003) (quoting
David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the FederalCourts, 1801-1835, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 646, 655-56 (1982)). The Privy Council-specifically its Judicial Committee-had final appellate
authority over legal disputes originating from the British colonies. See L. Kinvin Wroth, Notesfor a Comparative
Study of the Originsof Federalismin the UnitedStates and Canada, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 93, 114 (1998).
30. Whitman H. Ridgway, Introduction of Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court: Judicial
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review-the protection of discrete and insular minorities3 '-remains as powerful
as ever. But the goal for the growth of American popular democracy should be to
move the court toward a more limited practice ofjudiciousreview, not unlike what
was envisioned at the founding. The framers of the Constitution expected the
judiciary to operate within narrow confines in which judges would be freed from
the vagaries of politics and the constraints of legislative prescriptions.3 2 Thus, the
power of judicial review was originally intended to be deployed in the service of
federalism. 33 But as I illustrate below, the judiciary has exceeded the bounds set by
the Founders, in large part because the judiciary has evolved in a manner that the
Founders had not envisioned.
III. FEDERALISTS, ANTI-FEDERALISTS, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL STATECRAFT
As the nascent American republic emerged from the Revolution to debate the
merits and demerits of the proposed Constitution, two groups led the fight for its
ratification and rejection. Federalists advocated ratification, often under the pen
name Publius in the Federalist papers. 34 Anti-Federalists insisted on rejection,
signing their public appeals under such soubriquets as Cato,Brutus, and the Federal
Farmer.35 Federalists and Anti-Federalists disagreed about the advisability of
several constitutional provisions, including whether it would be possible, as a
matter of efficient jurisdiction, to manage concurrent federal and state powers of
taxation 36 and whether it would be wise, as a matter of statecraft, to devolve such
extensive powers onto the central government. 37 The distribution of powers between
federal and state institutions was another principal point of contention. The AntiFederalists feared that the Constitution would reduce the several states to the
diminutive status of municipal corporations,3 8 thereby consolidating all real
authority in the central government.39
Thejudiciary likewise featured prominently in the debate between the Federalists
and Anti-Federalists. Each side advanced a different conception of the judiciary,
along with a distinct forecast for the evolution of the modem American judiciary.
With the expedient benefit of hindsight, one could not be faulted for succumbing
to the temptation to name a winner based on a careful appraisal of the relative
Activism or Self-Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REv. 115, 115 (1987).
31. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
32. Wendy R. Weiser, Regulating Judges' PoliticalActivityAfter White, 68 ALB. L. REV. 651,681 (2005).
33. Jack N. Rakove, Once More into the JudicialBreach, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 381, 382 (2003).
34. But one constitutional scholar has argued that the FederalistPapers may not be a reliable source to
interpret the United States Constitution. See Seth Barrett Tillman, The Federalist Papers as Reliable Historical
Source Materialfor ConstitutionalInterpretation,105 W. VA. L. REv. 601 (2003).
35. Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking JaneandJohn Doe: OnlineAnonymity and the FirstAmendment,
8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 405,406 (2003); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,343 n.6 (1995);
Eric M. Axler, Note, The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth Amendment: The Restoration of the People's
UnenumeratedRights, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 431, 457 n.87 (2000).
36. Caleb Nelson, Originalismand Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHm. L. REv. 519, 543 (2003).
37. Jennifer Nedelsky, Book Review, Confining Democratic Politics:Anti-Federalists,Federalists,and
the Constitution, 96 HARv. L. REv. 340, 345-46 (1982).
38. H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REv. 633, 658 (1993).
39. Jack N. Rakove, The SecondAmendment: The HighestStage of Originalism,76CHm.-KENTL. REv. 103,
142 (2000).
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foresight of both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. Though historians should
perhaps resist the urge to do so,' I remain free to surrender to the lure of the siren
song. I therefore plead indulgence as I raise a query: in 1787, which of these two
bodies of public constitutionalists-the Federalists or Anti-Federalists-more
accurately presaged the American judiciary in its present incarnation as a public
institution that preempts rather than promotes popular democracy? On this question,
the answer could not be clearer: the Anti-Federalists were right and the Federalists
were wrong. What is significant, though, is not the shell of this hollow scorecard
tally but rather the analysis that underpinned the respective visions of the
Federalists and the Anti-Federalists about the role of the American judiciary in the
new republic.
A. FederalistFailures
There are perhaps few greater misfires in the annals of American founding
history than the Federalists' prediction that, of the three branches of government,
the judiciary would be the "least dangerous to the political rights of the
constitution"" and "incontestably.. .beyond comparison the weakest of the three
departments of power."4 2 For if the evolution of the American federation has
revealed anything about the judiciary, it is precisely the opposite. The pages of the
United States Reports are filled-some might say littered 43 -with bold strokes of
the staggering dominance of the Supreme Court in the social engineering of the
state." This stands in distinct contrast with the myopic projections of the Federalists
on the role of the judiciary in American government. Indeed, the Federalists
incorrectly predicted that the judiciary would have no discernible influence on the
nation apart from resolving discrete legal disputes.45 History has, in no uncertain
terms, rebutted the Federalists' expectation.4 6

40. See Gordon S. Wood, Ideology and the Origins of LiberalAmerica, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 628,632-33

(1987).
41.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("Whoever

attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a government in which they are
separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.").

42. Id. ("It proves incontestably that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three
departments of power....").
43.

See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 264 (1990) ("[Judicial review] always denies

the freedom of the people who voted for the representatives who enacted the law."); Editorial, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), June 19, 1957 ("rhe Court has usurped the power of the Congress, the State appellate courts and
the juries of the States. In the exercise of dictatorial powers the difference between the Kremlin and the Supreme
Court is that the Kremlin is composed of 11 men and the Supreme Court only 9."), quoted in David Riesman, New
Criticsof the Court, NEW REPUBLIC, July 29, 1957, at 9, 11.
44. See ino A. Graglia, "Interpreting"the Constitution:Posneron Bork, 44 STAN. L. REv. 10 19, 1028-29

(1992) (stating that judicial activism "has usurped decisionmaking power over so many issues-abortion, capital
punishment, criminal procedure, busing, prayer in the schools, government aid to church-run schools, pornography,
libel, street demonstrations, vagrancy control, discrimination on the basis of sex, alienage and illegitimacy, and so
on").
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 41, at 437 ("The judiciary, on the contrary,
has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society,
and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely

judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.").
46. See James L. Buckley, The Constitution and the Courts: A Question of Legitimacy, 24 HARV. J.L. &
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In The Federalist,Alexander Hamilton expressed what we know now to have
been a misplaced fear that the other branches of government would overpower the
judiciary. Americans, he argued, ought not worry about the judiciary dominating
either or both the legislature and the executive because the judiciary is a harmless
institution, designed only to safeguard the Constitution and never to assert its own
will over the electorate and its chosen representatives.47 "[T]he judiciary, from the
nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of
48
the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them,"
insisted Hamilton, adding that "the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of
the three departments of power."4 9 Therefore, "liberty," concluded Hamilton with
conviction that can only be disquieting to contemporary observers, "can have
nothing to fear from the judiciary alone."50
In Madison's view, the judiciary is the least dangerous branch and the legislature
is indisputably the most dangerous one. Unlike the judiciary, whose authority is
bordered within four clearly delimited corners, the legislature's authority, according
to Madison, is potentially plenary because the legislature is liable to exert a
surreptitious superiority over the other department-a supremacy derived subtly and
indirectly, yet irreversibly, from its power of the purse.5 The legislature's control
over dispensations to public officials only exacerbates the wide gulf of prominence
between the legislature and the judiciary, whose members, argued Federalists,
would be left powerless opposite legislative action constraining the role and
function of the judiciary.5"
Therefore, as Madison cautioned, "it is against the enterprising ambition of [the
legislature], that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their
precautions. 5 3 Madison wrote that this is inexorably true because "we have seen
that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the

PUB. POL'Y 189, 194-201 (2000) (cataloguing several cases in which the judiciary has breached the boundary
separating questions of law from those of policy).
47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 41.
48. Id. at 437.
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 41, at 310 ('Te legislative department derives
a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive,
and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect
measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of
real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure, will, or will not, extend beyond the
legislative sphere. On the other side, the executive power being restrained within a narrower compass and being
more simple in its nature, and the judiciary being described by landmarks still less uncertain, projects of usurpation
by either of these departments would immediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this all: as the legislative
department alone has access to the pockets of the people, and has in some constitutions full discretion, and in all
a prevailing influence, over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other departments, a dependence is thus
created in the latter, which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former.").
52. Id.
53. Id. at 309-10 ("But in a representative republic where the executive magistracy is carefully limited, both
in the extent and the duration of its power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is
inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is
sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of
pursuing the objects of its passions by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this
department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.").
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legislative, at the expense of the other departments."54 This aggrandizement results
from the failure of the legislature to differentiate between, on the one hand, the
popular election of its members by the people-which renders that deliberative
body a representative reflection of the people-and, on the other, the acquiescence
of the people to any action taken by the legislature on the strength of its popular
legitimacy-which improperly extrapolates from the previous election a mandate
to act without regard to the role and jurisdiction of the executive or judiciary.5 5
The Federalists defended their understanding of this legislative inclination with
what they regarded as a simple truth: there are fewer members in the executive and
judicial branches than there are in the legislature, which also claims for itself a
public trust on the strength of its closer connection to the people-particularly those
people who travel in the most influential circles.56 Armed with this insurmountable
advantage in popular legitimacy over both the judiciary and the executive, the
legislature will necessarily succumb to the lure of legislative overreaching, whose
consequence, concluded Madison, is to "extend[] the sphere of its activity and
draw[] all power into its impetuous vortex."5 7 Thus Madison suggested that parity
among the branches would be no more than a fiction if Americans did not remain
attentive to the legislature's predisposition to subjugate the other two branches of
government.58
The Federalists were wrong. Though the people should always guard with
uncompromising jealousy their popular sovereignty wherever threats emerge, their
watchful gaze should be fixed on the judiciary, not on the legislature. Under the

54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), supra note 41, at 314.
55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 41, at 410-11 ("The representatives of the
people, in a popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves, and betray strong
symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any other quarter; as if the exercise of its
rights, by either the executive or judiciary, were a breach of their privilege and an outrage to their dignity. They
often appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the other departments; and as they commonly have the
people on their side, they always act with such momentum as to make it very difficult for the other members of the
government to maintain the balance of the Constitution.").
56. THE FEDERALIST No.49 (James Madison), supra note 41, at 314-15 ("But whether made by one side
or the other, would each side enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view their different situations. The
members of the executive and judiciary departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small
part only of the people. The latter by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of
it, are too far removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions. The former are generally the objects
of jealousy and their administration is always liable to be discolored and rendered unpopular. The members of the
legislative department, on the other hand, are numerous. They are distributed and dwell among the people at large.
Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance embrace a great proportion of the most influential
part of the society. The nature of their public trust implies a personal influence among the people, and that they are
more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the people. With these advantages it can
hardly be supposed that the adverse party would have an equal chance for a favorable issue.").
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 41, at 309. Madison found one example of
legislative overreaching in Virginia:
[Jiudiciary and executive members were left dependent on the legislative for their subsistence
in office, and some of them for their continuance in it. If, therefore, the Legislature assumes
executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made; nor if made, can it be
effectual; because in that case they may put their proceedings into the form of acts of Assembly,
which will render them obligatory on the other branches.
Id. at 311 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRIGINA 195 (1785)).
58. Id. at 309 (cautioning readers about "legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same
hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations").
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Constitution, there are several potent limits on the power of the legislature.59
Foremost among these, the legislature must be reconstituted at regular intervals in
contested elections.6 ° These elections are the quintessential act of popular
engagement and public deliberation. 6 The members of the legislature must be
approved by-and once elected are answerable to-the people themselves, who
retain the right to remove them from their seats.62 In contrast, federal judges are
encumbered by no similar limits. They are sheltered from removal (except through
the extraordinary act of impeachment)6 3 by the gift of life tenure,6 4 buoyed in their
words and actions by an indulgent theory ofjudicial independence, 65 and freed from
the solemn commitment to popular accountability.66 When coupled with these
emoluments, the mighty pen that judges wield without popular review becomes
perhaps the most powerful instrument controlled by any public body in civil society.
The Federalists, at the founding, did not appreciate the consequences of imposing
such weak constitutional constraints on the judiciary. But the Anti-Federalists did.
B. Anti-FederalistProphecies
The new American republic emerged from its colonial years with a profound
distrust of the judicial branch, largely because courts had been dutifully submissive
agents of the Crown.67 For this reason, the Anti-Federalists fully endorsed three
features as indispensable to an independent and effective judiciary: (1) promptness
and impartiality in the administration of justice; (2) fairness and transparency in

59. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 41, at 438-39 (enumerating specific limits
on legislative power and stating that the legislature must be kept "within the limits assigned to [its] authority");
Perry Dane, "Omalous" Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1724-25 ("The Constitution establishes limits on
the normative authority of legislatures and other relevant actors. To say that an act is unconstitutional is to say that
those limits have been transgressed. To put it another way, a finding that a law is unconstitutional typically assumes
that the legislature could have, in principle, altered the law in some meaningful way so as to render it
constitutional." (footnotes omitted)); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the
constitution is written.").
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing for House elections); id. amend. XVII (providing for Senate
elections).
61. See Derek Shaffer, Note, Answering Justice Thomas in Saenz: Granting the Privilegesand Immunities
Clause Full Citizenship Within the FourteenthAmendment, 52 STAN. L. REV. 709, 742 (2000) (recognizing a
fundamental right to vote in state elections).
62. See supranote 60.
63. U.S. CONST. art. IL § 4.
64. Id. art. III, § l.
65. See Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 408,411 (1792) ("'Itis a principle important to freedom, that in
government, thejudicialshould be distinct from, and independent of, the legislative department. To this important
principle, the people of the United States, in forming their constitution, have manifested the highest regard."'
(quoting Letter from the circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania to the President of the United States)); see also
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1990) ("An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable
to justice in our society.").
66. David R. Keyser, State Constitutionsand Theories of JudicialReview: Some Variations on a Theme,
63 TEx. L. REv. 1051, 1075 (1985) ("The whole debate about what 'theory' ofjudicial review is appropriate arises
on the federal level because the power of judicial review in the federal system is exercised by judges who, alone
of all political decision makers in that system, are free from direct political accountability.").
67. F. Andrew HanssenLeamingAbout JudicialIndependence: InstitutionalChange in the State Courts,
33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 444 (2004).
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court proceedings; and (3) neutrality and wisdom in the interpretation of laws.68
These criteria-particularly judicial independence-remain reflective of what
thinkers regard as essential features for a judiciary in a liberal
contemporary
69
democracy.
Yet, in sharp contrast to faulty Federalist forecasts about the American judiciary,
the Anti-Federalists accurately foretold the powerful role that courts would
ultimately exercise in the new nation.7" In condemning the unprecedented
independence and power of the judiciary as envisioned in the proposed Constitution, the Anti-Federalists warned the people of the new nation that the Constitution,
once passed and ratified, would bar the people from exercising any power of
correction or meaningful oversight of the judiciary.7 ' Indeed, Brutus questioned
whether the world had ever seen such an immensely powerful and unchecked court
of justice as the one fashioned by the constitutional drafters gathered at the historic
convention of 1787.72 The proposed Constitution provided no appeal from a
Supreme Court judgment-a decision that immediately assumed the force of
law-nor did it permit any governmental body to rehabilitate erroneous judicial
determinations of either law or fact.73 The Constitution therefore granted the
judiciary what the Anti-Federalists accurately observed was an irreversible and
absolute supremacy 74 in interpreting the constitutional text and elaborating the
rights and restrictions pertinent to the government7-powers said at the time to

68. FEDERAL FARMER XV (Jan. 18, 1788), reprintedin THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 315 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981) ("In forming this branch, our objects are-a fair and open, a wise and impartial interpretation
of the laws-a prompt and impartial administration of justice, between the public and individuals, and between
man and man. I believe, there is no feature in a free government more difficult to be well formed than this,
especially in an extensive country, where the courts must be numerous, or the citizens travel to obtain justice.").
69. See William J. Aceves, Liberalismand InternationalLegal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and the
Move Toward a UniversalSystem of TransnationalLaw Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'LL.J. 129, 170 (2000); Eric A.
Posner & John C. Yoo, JudicialIndependence in InternationalTribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005); Paul B.
Stephan, Redistributive Litigation:JudicialInnovation, PrivateExpectations, and the Shadow of International
Law,88 VA. L. REV. 789, 791 (2002).
70. The Federalists did not take the Anti-Federalist predictions seriously. See Jonathan T. Molot, An Old
Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 67-69 (2003).
71. BRUTUS XI (Jan. 31, 1788), supra note 68, at 418 ("It is, moreover, of great importance, to examine
with care the nature and extent of the judicial power, because those who are to be vested with it, are to be placed
in a situation altogether unprecedented in a free country. They are to be rendered totally independent, both of the
people and the legislature, both with respect to their offices and salaries. No errors they may commit can be
corrected by any power above them, if any such power there be, nor can they be removed from office for making
ever so many erroneous adjudications.").
72. BRUTUS XV (Mar. 20, 1788), supra note 68, at 438 ("I question whether the world ever saw, in any
period of it, a court of justice invested with such immense powers, and yet placed in a situation so little
responsible.").
73. BRUTUS XI (Jan. 31, 1788), supra note 68, at 420 ("The opinions of the supreme court, whatever they
may be, will have the force of law; because there is no power provided in the constitution, that can correct their
errors, or controul their adjudications. From this court there is no appeal. And I conceive the legislature themselves,
cannot set aside a judgment of this court, because they are authorised by the constitution to decide in the last
resort.").
74. BRUTUS XV (Mar. 20, 1788), supra note 68, at 438 ("But the judges under this constitution will
controul the legislature, for the supreme court are authorised in the last resort, to determine what is the extent of
the powers of the Congress; they are to give the constitution an explanation, and there is no power above them to
set aside their judgment." (footnotes omitted)).
75. BRUrUs XII (Feb. 7, 1788), supra note 68, at 423 ("And the courts are vested with the supreme and
uncontroulable power, to determine, in all cases that come before them, what the constitution means; they cannot,
therefore, execute a law, which, in their judgment, opposes the constitution, unless we can suppose they can make
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transcend any power before given to a judicial body by any free government under
heaven.76
In the eyes of the Anti-Federalists, this extraordinary devolution of powers to the
judiciary would result in but one outcome: the judiciary would have the authority
to mold the government into any shape that it pleased.77 Though the Anti-Federalists
could not predict the principles that would inspire the federal courts to act in this
regard, they accurately foresaw that "very liberal" decisions 78 would result from the
constitutionally enshrined power of judges to reach beyond the letter of the
Constitution in order to summon its amorphous spirit and reason. 79 The AntiFederalists therefore foresaw with astonishing precision that the right of the
judiciary to invalidate any act of the legislature deemed inconsistent with the
Constitution by j udges°--a judicial prerogative that violates a cardinal principle of
representative government 8 -would catapult the judiciary into a station "exalted
above all other power in the government, and subject to no controul."82 In addition
to these broad thoughts about the design of the judiciary, the Anti-Federalists
pointed to three specific-and prophetic--concerns about the role of the judiciary
in the American polity: (1) the expansive authority of the judiciary as final arbiter
of the meaning of the proposed Constitution; (2) the merger of law, equity, and fact
in one court, at the time something as yet unseen; and (3) the propensity of judges
as political actors to widen the scope of their own powers.
First, the Anti-Federalists were troubled by the elasticity of several passages in
the proposed Constitution, which would permit federal courts to stretch the bounds
of reasonable constitutional interpretation toward the end of amplifying their
powers at the expense of the several states.83 In particular, Brutus believed that
federal courts would bleed the states of their already limited authority.' The

a superior law give way to an inferior.").
76. BRUTUS XV (Mar. 20, 1788), supra note 68, at 438 ("[T]he judicial under this system have a power
which is above the legislative, and which indeed transcends any power before given to a judicial by any free
government under heaven.").
77. BRUTUS XI (Jan. 31, 1788), supra note 68, at 422 ("This power in the judicial, will enable them to
mould the government, into almost any shape they please.").
78. BRUTUS XII (Feb. 7, 1788), supra note 68, at 424 ("What the principles are, which the courts will adopt,
it is impossible for us to say; but taking up the powers as I have explained them in my last number, which they will
possess under this clause, it is not difficult to see, that they may, and probably will, be very liberal ones." (emphasis
added)).
79. Id. ("We have seen, that they will be authorized to give the constitution a construction according to its
spirit and reason, and not to confine themselves to its letter.").
80. BRUTUS XV (Mar. 20, 1788), supra note 68, at 440 ("If, therefore, the legislature pass any laws,
inconsistent with the sense the judges put upon the constitution, they will declare it void; and therefore in this
respect their power is superior to that of the legislature.").
81. BRUTUS XVI (Apr. 10, 1788), supra note 68, at 442 ("Perhaps no restraints are more forcible, than such
as arise from responsibility to some superior power.-Hence it is that the true policy of a republican government

is, to frame it in such manner, that all persons who are concerned in the government, are made accountable to some
superior for their conduct in office.").
82. BRUTUS XV (Mar. 20, 1788), supra note 68, at 437 ("I said in my last number, that the supreme court
under this constitution would be exalted above allother power in the government, and subject to no controul.").
83. Aaron J. O'Brien, Note, States' Repeal: A Proposed ConstitutionalAmendment to Reinvigorate
Federalism,44 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 547, 553-56 (1996).
84. BRUTUS I (Oct. 18, 1787), supranote 68, at 367 ("It is easy to see, that in the common course of things,

these courts will eclipse the dignity, and take away from the respectability, of the state courts. These courts will
be, in themselves, totally independent of the states, deriving their authority from the United States, and receiving
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perimeter of state jurisdiction, Brutus feared, would be eroded along each of its
axes-legislative, executive, and judicial-as a result of Supreme Court decisions
on the issue of federal jurisdiction. 5 It could be no other way, thought Brutus,
because where the Constitution establishes concurrentjurisdiction between federal
and state organs, the judiciary-as a federal institution-would likely shrink the
range of state sovereignty."g And so it has come to pass today.8 7
Although the proposed Constitution authorized the legislature to craft the laws
of the Union, it also ensured that judges, "in their interpretations, and in directing
the execution of them, have a very extensive influence for preserving or destroying
liberty, and for changing the nature of government., 88 The judiciary, as the ultimate
umpire of constitutional meaning, 9 poses a greater danger of sowing the seeds of
arbitrary government than either the legislature or the executive 9° precisely because
the Constitution endows judges with vast discretion to interpret laws and the
Constitution itself according to their own wisdom and inclinations. 91
This risk to American democracy would not be immediately discernible but
would instead manifest itself slowly over time, noted the Anti-Federalists. Unlike
the immediate effect of an executive seizure or an unjust law duly passed by the
legislature-which the people would discover very soon thereafter-the intricacy
from them fixed salaries; and in the course of human events it is to be expected, that they will swallow up all the
powers of the courts in the respective states.").
85. BRUTUS XI (Jan. 31, 1788), supra note 68, at 420 ("The judicial power will operate to effect, in the
most certain, but yet silent and imperceptible manner, what is evidently the tendency of the constitution:-I mean,
an entire subversion of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states. Every adjudication
of the supreme court, on any question that may arise upon the nature and extent of the general government, will
affect the limits of the state jurisdiction. In proportion as the former enlarge the exercise of their powers, will that
of the latter be restricted.").
86. BRUTUS XII (Feb. 14, 1788), supra note 68, at 427 ("It is obvious that these courts will have authority
to decide upon the validity of the laws of any of the states, in all cases where they come in question before them.
Where the constitution gives the general government exclusive jurisdiction, they will adjudge all laws made by the
states, in such cases, void ab initio. Where the constitution gives them concurrent jurisdiction, the laws of the
United States must prevail, because they are they supreme law. In such cases, therefore, the laws of the state
legislatures must be repealed, restricted, or so construed, as to give full effect to the laws of the union on the same
subject. From these remarks it is easy to see, that in proportion as the general government acquires power and
jurisdiction, by the liberal construction which the judges may give the constitution, will those of the states lose its
rights, until they become so trifling and unimportant, as not to be worth having.").
87. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The EnumeratedPowers of States, 3 NEV. L.J. 469 (2003) (arguing that
federal judicial judgments have improperly expanded the sphere of federal institutions at the expense of state
sovereignty); see also Larry J. Obhof, Federalism,lPresume?A Look at the Enforcement of FederalismPrinciples
Through Presumptionsand ClearStatement Rules, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 123, 162 ("The twentieth century was
marked by a significant increase in federal authority vis-A-vis that of the states. In the judicial sphere this expansion
was marked by broad constitutional interpretations that gave the federal government the power to regulate a large
expanse of activity. Much of the increased federal power came at the expense of the states, which traditionally
enjoyed substantial responsibilities in a number of areas of law.").
88. FEDERAL FARMER XV (Jan. 18, 1788), supra note 68, at 315 ("It is true, the laws are made by the
legislature; but the judges and juries, in their interpretations, and in directing the execution of them, have a very
extensive influence for preserving or destroying liberty, and for changing the nature of the government.").
89. BRUTUS XI (Jan. 31, 1788), supranote 68, at 419 ("They are authorised to determine all questions that
may arise upon the meaning of the constitution in law.").
90. FEDERAL FARMER XV (Jan. 18, 1788), supra note 68, at 316 ("[W]e may fairly conclude, we are more
in danger of sowing the seeds of arbitrary government in this department than in any other.").
91. Id. at 315 ("It is an observation of an approved writer, that judicial power is of such a nature, that when
we have ascertained and fixed its limits, with all the caution and precision we can, it will yet be formidable,
somewhat arbitrary and despotic-that is, after all our cares, we must leave a vast deal of discretion and
interpretation-to the wisdom, integrity, and politics of the judges....").
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and obscurity of a court decision that imposed its will upon the people under the
guise of interpreting the Constitution or a law would not be discovered or
understood until much later.92 The result, thought the Anti-Federalists, was a kind
of stealthy deployment of constitutional authority-the very opposite of what the
people demand and expect in a liberal democracy. 93
Second, Anti-Federalists criticized the proposed Constitution for "improperly
blend[ing]" the powers of law, equity, and fact in the hands of judges, contrary to
the practice in "well balanced governments" of keeping these powers distinct.94 For
the Federal Farmer, the British judiciary was a model worthy of embracing in
America because Great Britain possessed ajudiciary where questions of law resided
with a judge, those of equity with a chancellor, and those of fact with a jury. 95 The
proposed American Constitution, however, granted the judiciary the authority to
determine law and fact as well as the expedient maneuverability to draw on its
reserve power of equity. 96
According to Anti-Federalists, the fusion of these powers within a judge in the
new republic exploded the most noble and important principle of the common law.97
This merger of functions proposed by the Federalists in the American
Constitution-in which there was no evidence of "a spark of freedom"-was "a
very dangerous thing" because,
if the law restrain [a judge], he is only to step into his shoes of equity, and give
what judgment his reason or opinion may dictate; we have no precedents in this
country, as yet, to regulate the divisions in equity as in Great Britain; equity,
therefore, in the supreme court for many years will be mere discretion.98
92. Id. at 316 ("When the legislature makes a bad law, or the first executive magistrates usurp upon the
rights of the people, they discover the evil much sooner, than the abuses of power in the judicial department; the
proceedings of which are far more intricate, complex, and out of their immediate view. A bad law immediately
excites a general alarm; a bad judicial determination, though not less pernicious in its consequences, is immediately
felt, probably, by a single individual only, and noticed only by his neighbours, and a few spectators in the court.").
93. Id. ("[P]articular circumstances exist at this time to increase our inattention to limiting properly the
judicial powers....We are not sufficiently attentive to the circumstances, that the measures of popular legislatures
naturally settle down in time, and gradually approach a mild and just medium; while the rigid systems of the law
courts naturally become more severe and arbitrary, if not carefully tempered and guarded by the constitution, and
by laws, from time to time.").
94. FEDERAL FARMERHI (Oct. 10, 1788), supra note 68, at 237 ("In the judicial department, powers ever
kept distinct in well balanced governments, are no less improperly blended in the hands of the same men-in the
judges of the supreme court is lodged, the law, the equity and the fact.").
95. Id. at 244 ("[W]e have no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the divisions in equity as in
Great Britain....").
96. Id. ("The judicial powers of the federal courts extends in law and equity to certain cases: and, therefore,
the powers to determine on the law, in equity, and as to the fact, all will concentre in the supreme court....").
97. FEDERAL FARMER XV (Jan. 18, 1788), supranote 68, at 319 ("The supreme court, in cases of appeals,
shall have jurisdiction both as to law and fact: that is, in all civil causes carried up to the supreme court by appeals,
the court, or judges, shall trythe fact and decide the law. Here an essential principle of the civil law is established,
and the most noble and important principle of the common law exploded.").
98. FEDERAL FARMER III (Oct. 10, 1788), supra note 68, at 244 ("These powers [of law and equity], which
by this constitution are blended in the same hands, the same judges, are in Great-Britain [sic] deposited in different
hands-to wit, the decision of the law in the law judges, the decision in equity in the chancellor, and the trial of
the fact in the jury. It is a very dangerous thing to vest in the same judge power to decide on the law, and also
general powers in equity; for if the law restrain him, he is only to step into his shoes of equity, and give what
judgment his reason or opinion may dictate; we have no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the divisions
in equity as in Great Britain; equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many years will be mere discretion. I
confess in the constitution of this supreme court, as left by the constitution, I do not see a spark of freedom or a
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The theory of judicial discretion, in the view of the Anti-Federalists, was a mere
smokescreen that emboldened judges and conferred upon them the arbitrary power
to rely on conscience, opinion, caprice, or politics in deciding cases.99 On this point,
too, the Anti-Federalists appear to have been correct. '0
Third, quite apart from the institutional features of the judiciary that make it
susceptible to self-aggrandizement, thought the Anti-Federalists, the individuals that
occupy the bench are likewise subject to similarly strong temptations. 0 l' The least
of these is certainly not the thirst for-and, once acquired, obsession with-power,
something the Anti-Federalists saw as a source of great concern.0 2 When faced with
the choice to either limit or extend their own powers, judges, Brutus believed,
would of course hesitate to restrict them and would instead "enlarge the sphere of
their own authority."'0 1 3 Judges have no inducement to do otherwise, argued Brutus,
particularly because "there is no power above them .... no authority that can remove
them, and they cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature."' t° The AntiFederalists perceived this disincentive t15 to acting responsibly and respectfully of
popular will as having the disastrous effect of elevating judges to a unique status in
the American polity: "they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of
every power under heaven."' 6Women and men discharging their public duty under

shadow of our own or the British common law.").
99. FEDERAL FARMER XV (Jan. 18, 1788), supranote 68, at 322-23 ("Therefore, it would seem, that if [the
words 'in law and equity'] mean any thing, they must have a further meaning: yet I will not suppose it intended
to lodge an arbitrary power or discretion in the judges, to decide as their conscience, their opinions, their caprice,
or their politics might dictate.").
100. See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("When the political branches of the
government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be
understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under
settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed."); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) ("[[It is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution." (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803))); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18
(1958) (proclaiming that the Court possesses the final word on constitutional matters) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) at 177).
101. BRUTUS XI (Jan. 31, 1788), supra note 68, at 421 ("[E]very body of men invested with office are
tenacious of power....").
102. Id. at 422 ("[Jludges will be interested to extend the powers of the courts....").
103. Id. at 421 ("Every body of men invested with office are tenacious of power; they feel interested, and
hence it has become a kind of maxim, to hand down their offices, with all its rights and privileges, unimpaired to
their successors; the same principle will influence them to extend their power, and increase their rights; this of itself
will operate strongly upon the courts to give such a meaning to the constitution in all cases where it can possibly
be done, as will enlarge the sphere of their own authority. Every extension of the power of the general legislature,
as well as of the judicial powers, will increase the powers of the courts; and the dignity and importance of the
judges, will be in proportion to the extent and magnitude of the powers they exercise.").
104. BRUTUS XV (Mar. 20, 1788), supra note 68, at 322 ("[T]hey have made the judges independent, in the
fullest sense of the word. There is no power above them, to controul any of their decisions. There is no authority
that can remove them, and they cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature. In short, they are independent
of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon
feel themselves independent of heaven itself.").
105. FEDERAL FARMER XV (Jan. 18, 1788), supra note 68, at 316 ("In this country, we have been always
jealous of the legislature, and especially the executive; but not always of the judiciary: but very few men attentively
consider the essential parts of it, and its proceedings, as they tend to support or destroy free government: only a few
professional men are in a situation properly to do this; and it is often alleged, that instances have not frequently
occurred, in which they have been found very alert watchmen in the cause of liberty, or in the cause of democratic
republics.").
106. See supranote 104.
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these illusory parameters could not resist the urge to "soon feel themselves
independent of heaven itself."' 7 Again, much as the Anti-Federalists were correct
in their prophecies on the first two points of contention, the third marks yet another
score in the Anti-Federalist column.108
IV. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE JUDICIAL BOUNDARY
With the benefit of nearly two centuries of American jurisprudence, the great
constitutional scholar Alexander Bickel drew attention to the Federalists' mistaken
assessment of the constitutional balance of power in the American polity." Though
Bickel agreed with the Federalist proposition that inequity would inevitably result
in the distribution and exercise of power among the three branches of
government," 0 Bickel and the Federalists disagreed on which branch warranted the
most suspicion. For Bickel, it was not the legislature, as it had been for Federalists.
It was the judiciary. According to Bickel, the judiciary's practice of judicial review
concealed a "counter-majoritarian force" insofar as judicial review allowed an
unelected and unrepresentative branch to thwart the will of the people."' Contrary
to the founding myth of three co-equal branches-and contrary to Federalist
forecasts of a least dangerous judicial branch-Bickel argued that the judiciary had
appropriated to itself determinative authority in constitutional interpretation, in so
doing subordinating the people's judgment to its own."12
To rectify this imbalance, Bickel turned to the legislature to remedy what he
regarded as a "deviant" state of affairs.' Bickel stopped short of insisting on
enlarged legislative powers but demanded a recalibration of constitutional powers,
which he anchored in three principles: (1) representative government; (2)
democratic legitimacy; and (3) popular will. 114 First, explained Bickel in his
discussion of the rightful role of Congress, democracy does not require legislators
to endorse the theory of government-by-referenda, or "the making of decisions in
town meeting by a show of hands,"1 5 but it must allow for a representative majority
to effect change when the people so desire." 6 Second, statutes possess a degree of
democratic legitimacy that is superior to judicial decisions because "statutes are the
product of the legislature and the executive acting in concert, and [because] the
executive represents a very different constituency [than the legislature, this] tends
to cure inequities of over- and underrepresentation.'' And third, Bickel regarded

107. BRUTUS XV (Mar. 20, 1788), supra note 68, at 438.
108. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and the PoliticalBranches: Democratic Theory and
Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 810, 811 (1974) (stating that judicial invalidation of an executive or legislative act
usurps popular will); Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1538 (1990)
("Accountability to the electorate is the touchstone of legitimacy.").
109. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986).
110. Id. at 18.
111. Id. at 16.
112. Id.at 16-17.
113. Id. at 18.
114. Id. at 16-33.
115. Id.at 17.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 18.
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the legislative branch as best positioned and most suitably equipped to express the
will of the people."'
These three Bickellian principles may serve as useful signposts in brainstorming
promising strategies to temper the overwhelming influence of the judiciary on
American civic and political culture. This is a problem that Mark Tushnet calls
"democratic debilitation"-a crisis of popular constitutional legitimacy that occurs
"when the public and their democratically elected representatives cease to formulate
and discuss constitutional norms, instead relying on the courts to address
constitutional problems."" 9 Three particular reforms-each enlarging the powers
of the people-could return the American polity to participatory and popular
government: (1) reinstating the Council of Censors, an artifact of the British
colonial era through which the people could articulate their views on important
matters of the day; 2 ' (2) restoring the Council of Revision, an analogue of the
Council of Censors that sanitized legislation before the bill was given effect; 121 and
(3) importing a Canadian mechanism known as a non-obstante clause, 122which
authorizes the legislature to suspend the application of a judicial decision.
A. The Council of Censors
The first Bickellian mechanism that could help to remedy the existing
constitutional imbalance is drawn from colonial America, specifically from
Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Constitution of the pre-revolutionary era was
widely regarded as more democratic than all others. 123 The document left no doubt
that the state government was subordinate to the people and that public officials
held their posts and discharged their respective functions only at the pleasure of the
people.'24 Indeed, the stated objective of the constitution was to transform
Pennsylvania into a majoritocracy, thus removing all obstructions separating the
people from the sacred liberty of self-governance.' 25 This populism imbued early
American legislatures like Pennsylvania's26 and manifested itself in frequent
legislative corrections of judicial missteps. 1
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 created an elected body known as the
Council of Censors. 127 The Council consisted of regular citizens 12 8-two from each

118. See id. at 16-17.
119. Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the
CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 275 (1995).
120. See infra Part [V.A.
121. See infra Part I.B.
122. See infra Part IV.C.
123. JACKSONTURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OFTHECONSTITUTION, 1781-1788, at42 (3d

ed. 2004).
124. Christian G. Fritz, Recovering the Lost Worlds of America's Written Constitutions, 68 ALB. L. REV.
261, 288 (2005) ("Moreover, the constitution repeatedly suggested that government and its officials were
subordinate to the people, subject to the people's vigilant scrutiny.").
125. James A. Gardner, Forcing States to Be Free: The Emerging ConstitutionalGuarantee of Radical
Democracy, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1467, 1489 (2003).
126. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995).
127. Donald Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservatism as a ConstitutionalPhilosophy,71 IOWA L. REV. 401,
472 n.369 (1986).
128. Nash E. Long, The "ConstitutionalRemand": JudicialReview of ConstitutionallyDubious Statutes,
14 J.L. & POL. 667, 695 n.107 (1998).
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county, 29 twenty-six in total' 3° -upon whom the people conferred the authority to
call a convention to amend the state constitution if two thirds of its members
agreed. 13 1 The Council was a hybrid entity that stood hierarchically above the
unicameral legislature, meaning that the Council's powers and authority trumped
those of the single-chamber legislative branch. 3 2 Though the Council of Censors
merged both executive and judicial functions into a single station, 133 there were no
judges or judicial officers on the Council.134
Every seven years, the people of Pennsylvania would elect the membership of the
Council of Censors, which would subsequently gather to consider the state of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. 35 The Council's role was to inquire, as a general matter,
whether any of the three branches of government had improperly enlarged the scope
of its powers at the expense of the others, 36 for instance, whether the legislature had
deviated in any material way from the commands of the constitution.' 37 Its specific
function was to assess, sometimes through investigations, 38 whether the
constitution had been violated in any respect. 139 In short, its duty was to interpret the
constitution. "4 This quasi-judicial body was not authorized to declare laws
unconstitutional but was entitled to censure, impeach, recommend the repeal of
laws, convene a constitutional convention,' 41 denounce the state assembly, 42 and
declare statutes "repugnant" to the constitution. 4' 3 The Council sought to uphold the
original purity of the text, emphasizing preservation over alteration.'1
The Council of Censors was an august body of Pennsylvanians, "as distinguished
for virtue and talents as any body of men ever representing the people of

129. HARRY M. WARD, THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY

24 (2000).
130. JOHN HOWE, LANGUAGE AND POLITICAL MEANING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 61 (2003).
131. PA. CONST. § 47 (1776).
132. See David E. Kyvig, Arrangingfor Amendment: Unintended Outcomes of ConstitutionalDesign, in
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 9, 15 (David E. Kyvig ed., 2000).
133. Anthony V. Baker, "So Extraordinary, So Unprecedented an Authority": A Conceptual
Reconsiderationof the SingularDoctrine of JudicialReview, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 729, 741 n.55 (2001).
134. Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism:Did the Founders
Contemplate JudicialEnforcement of "Unwritten" IndividualRights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421,447 (1991).
135. Price Marshall, "A CarelessWritten Letter"-SituatingAmendments to the FederalConstitution, 51
ARK. L. REV. 95, 103 (1998).

136. James S. Liebman & Brandon L. Garrett, MadisonianEqualProtection,104 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 924
n.423 (2004).
137. Respublica v. M'Clean, 4 Yeates 399, 404 (Pa. 1807).
138. See Charles H. Sturdy, Note, Section 27A ConfrontsLampf and the Constitution,74 B.U. L. REV. 645,
652 n.41 (1994).
139. See Randall T. Shepard, The Renaissancein State ConstitutionalLaw: ThereAre a Few Dangers,but
What's the Alternative?, 61 ALa. L. REV. 1529, 1550 n.100 (1998).
140. Commonwealth ex rel. Reynolds v. Bussier, 5 Serge. & Rawle 451,460 (Pa. 1820).
141. Jeremy Elkins, Declarationsof Rights, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 243, 307 n.214 (1996).
142. See James E. Castello, Comment, The Limits of PopularSovereignty: Using the Initiative Power to
Control Legislative Procedure,74 CAL. L. REV. 491, 549 n.307 (1986) (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.

486, 529-30 (1969)).
143. Cf.Carl H. Esbeck, Dissentand Disestablishment:The Church-StateSettlement in the EarlyAmerican
Republic, 2004 BYUL. REv. 1385, 1528 (2004) (referring to the Vermont Council of Censors' finding that an act
was "'repugnant' to Vermont's Declaration of Rights").
144. MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 55 (1999).
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Pennsylvania, urg[ing] the justice and equity of the claims upon the legislature."' 4 5
Its constitutional interpretations and judgments were considered binding upon the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 41 6 Among the several official acts that the Council
performed in the interest of the democratic integrity of Pennsylvania, the Council
issued criticisms aimed at Pennsylvania legislators for having circumvented
customary legislative procedures by adopting illusory "resolves" instead of more
properly proposing and passing bills.'47 The Council also issued a now-famous
report that chronicled instance after instance of illegitimate legislative intervention
into the judicial process at the behest of private and special interests.'4 8 In addition,
the Council denounced the expulsion of a legislator for failing to conform to the
procedures set forth in the state constitution. 149
But the Council was maligned by observers of the day for its exclusivity,
malapportionment, and supermajority-as opposed to simple majority- requirement. 5° These perceived shortcomings were only exacerbated by the Council's
inability to insulate itself from public opinion and the pressure that only a
vacillating electorate can bring to bear on elected officials.' 5 ' Madison-who for
his part was most interested in seeing each branch of government respect its own
constitutional boundary 52 -did not approve of the Council largely because he
thought it relied more on passion than on reason in exercising its function.'5 3 This
criticism resonated with Pennsylvania Republicans, who viewed the Council as a
threat to the rule of law. 54 The Council was ultimately abandoned in the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790.'
The Vermont Constitution authorized a similar Council of Censors, elected every
seven years,"' composed of "men of the first respectability for intelligence, having
great experience in legislation, and a thorough knowledge of the principles of [the

145. Barney v. Sutton, 2 Watts 31, 36 (Pa. 1833).
146. Johns v. Nichols, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 184, 186 (Pa. 1792) (conceding that "exposition given to this subject
by the Council of Censors, is binding on the present decision").
147. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 982 & n.17 (1983).
148. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 220-21 (1995) (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS 6 (Bailey ed. 1784)).
149. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 529 (1969).
150. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment Outside Article V, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 457, 483-84 (1994) ("Thus, as early as 1777 we find Pennsylvanians expressly attacking the
exclusivity of the Council of Censors. Though specially elected by the people for the express purpose of effecting
constitutional change-and thus in some respects like a convention-the Council was malapportioned and operated
under a two-thirds rule.").
151. See James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition:Towarda FirstAmendment Right
to Pursue JudicialClaims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899,944 n. 156 (1997) (noting the impact
of public opinion on the work of the Council).
152. See James A. Gardner, Democracy Without a Net? Separation of Powers and the Idea of SelfSustaining ConstitutionalConstraintson Undemocratic Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 293, 300-01 (2005).
153. Emery G. Lee III, The Federalist in an Age of Faction:Rethinking Federalist No. 76 on the Senate's
Role in the JudicialConfirmationsProcess,30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 235,249 (2004) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
50 (James Madison)).
154. MORTIMER N.S. SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 41

(1994).
155. Stephen B. Presser, ConstitutionalAmendments: DangerousThreat or Democracyin Action?, 5 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 209, 222 (2000).
156. Hartness v. Black, 114 A. 44, 45 (Vt. 1921).
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Vermont] government."' 57 The mission of the Vermont Council resembled its
Pennsylvanian analogue: "to enquire whether the constitution has been preserved
inviolate, in every part; and whether the legislative and executive branches of
government have performed their duty as guardians of the people, or assumed to
themselves, or exercised, other or greater powers, than they are entitled to by the
constitution."' 158 The judgments of the Vermont Council were viewed with great
respect.'59 But they were merely advisory in nature and were given force and effect
only through adoption by the state legislature."6 Vermont abolished its Council in
1870. 161
The Pennsylvania and Vermont Councils may offer the building blocks for a
federal mechanism to give voice to the people and to authorize them to shape the
society in which they live. Imagine a federal incarnation of the Council of Censors.
Every twelve years-or a preferable interval-the American people would head to
the polls in order to elect a national Council of Censors. Each state would place one
member on the Council, thus creating a fifty-member body. Candidates for the post
would likely be women and men of great learning whose experience, education, and
endorsements would presumably be the foremost indicators against which voters
would gauge their respective candidacies. It would be naive to believe that
partisanship would not infuse these elections. But partisanship would not
necessarily be harmful to the collective exercise of electing a state representative
to serve as a sentinel for the sanctity of the Constitution.
This fifty-member group would convene periodically to assess whether the
federal judiciary had properly interpreted the U.S. Constitution and to ensure that
the judiciary had not exceeded its constitutional function. One example of judicial
excess might be an opinion that sets public policy in the guise of simply resolving
a private dispute or interpreting the Constitution or a law. 62 Another example of
judicial action that could warrant the attention of the Council could be an opinion
63
that inappropriately or too hastily invalidates a duly enacted congressional statute. 1
In the face of such judicial excess, the Council would have the power to annul the
judicial action where the Council determined that the judiciary had erred in some
way.
The universe of reviewable decisions would include only final U.S. Supreme
Court judgments and appellate or other federal decisions for which an appeal had
not been sought or for which the Supreme Court had denied certiorari. This would
effectively be an additional layer of judicial review, the principal difference being
that popularly elected representatives would be charged with the sole function of
performing the review. Admittedly, it would be an extraordinary act to reverse a
Supreme Court decision. For this reason, it may not be defensible to allow a simple
majority of a Federal Council of Censors to trump a Supreme Court or other federal
157. Lyman v. Mower, 2 Vt. 517, 519 (1830).
158. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 2, § 44.
159. Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 553 (Vt. 1999).
160. State v. Saari, 568 A.2d 344, 348-49 (Vt. 1989).
161. State v. Wood, 536 A.2d 902, 907 n.6 (Vt. 1987).
162. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (authorizing urban renewal programs).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
which prohibited the possession of a firearm in and around a school).
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judicial opinion. Therefore, suppose the requirement to void a judicial decision
were a supermajority-requiring thirty-three of the fifty votes on the Council, or
sixty-six percent of a quorum. Such a threshold would have at least two laudable
features. First, it would ensure that only an extraordinary expression of popular will
could displace the decision of a judge, who may assert some measure of popular
consent buttressing her official acts as a result of her presidential appointment and
Senate confirmation by majority vote. Second, requiring a supermajority threshold
from the fifty American states would give due regard to the diversity that
distinguishes the several states from each other. To be more specific, if a
supermajority of the fifty dissimilar and distinct states found agreement on an issue
of national importance, that would be in and of itself a declaration that merited
notice and whose popular legitimacy would be difficult to question.
Let us imagine how the Council would operate in practice. Think back to the
controversial decision of Roe v. Wade64-the fabled precedent upholding the right
to a medical abortion-which was issued in 1973 to mixed reactions from
Americans. 65 The Federal Council of Censors could have chosen to review the
Supreme Court's decision after the release of the judgment. If a supermajority of the
members of the Council-representing at least thirty-three of the fifty states of the
Union-determined that the Supreme Court had rendered an incorrect or imprudent
interpretation of the Constitution, the decision would have been invalidated. The
result would have been to return the United States to the status quo existing before
the case had been decided. On the other hand, if at least eighteen of the fifty states
believed that Roe had been correctly decided, this block of councilors would have
been sufficient to thwart any reversal of the Supreme Court. What is more, this
eighteen-state declaration of popular support for the Supreme Court's decision in
Roe could have perhaps helped to quell or at least placate the vocal dissenters of
166
that era who, still today, have yet to accept Roe as the law of the United States.
The Council could therefore also play a unifying role in a divided country. And it
would do so while adhering to the three principles against which Bickel measured
the advisability of a recalibration of constitutional power-representative
government, democratic legitimacy, and popular will.
B. The Council of Revision
For a second Bickellian mechanism to restore balance to the American
Constitution, we may look to post-revolutionary New York. The 1777 Constitution
of the state of New York established a Council of Revision, composed of the state
Governor, the Chancellor of the court of equity, and members of the state supreme

164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
165. See, e.g., Michael D. Daneker, Moral Reasoning and the Questfor Legitimacy, 43 AM. U. L. Rev. 49,
70 n. 150 (1993) (citing newspaper articles for the proposition that Americans were divided on abortion when the
Court decided Roe); Michel Rosenfeld, Law and the PostmodernMind: The Identity of the ConstitutionalSubject,
16 CARDozo L. REv. 1049, 1066 (1995) (stating that "bitter controversy" followed Roe).
166. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Abortion Foes Gain on New Front, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2006, at A I (tracking
the progress of bills on "fetal pain"); Suzannah Gonzales, Roe v. Wade FoesRally, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Jan.
29, 2006, at B 1 (describing march organized to protest holding of Roe); Stephanie Simon, Abortion Ban Foes
Petitionfor a Choice, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, at Al (outlining effort in South Dakota to challenge holding of

Roe).
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court.'67 The function of the Council was to review legislation for defects before it
was enacted into law. 168 In this role, the Council of Revision would review a bill
enacted by the New York legislature and could subsequently reject it on the basis
of unconstitutionality or, more generally, on the basis of inconsistency with the
public good. 6 9 This was a very broad power of review, permitting the Council to
veto bills that simply seemed improper in their eyes. 7 ° In vetoing a proposed bill,
the Council of Revision could either invalidate it outright or return it to the
legislature for reconsideration with suggested amendments.' When the Council
invalidated a bill, one of the judges sitting on the panel would normally write an
opinion explaining the Council's grounds for rejection. 172 A supermajority of both
houses of the bicameral legislature could override the Council's veto or return of
bills.'
During the Council's lifetime, it returned 169 bills to the legislature with its
objections; and the legislature overrode fifty-one of those returns."' The Council
exercised its veto power on three principal bases, in descending order of frequency:
(1) policy reasons; (2) unconstitutionality; and (3) inconsistency with the spirit of
the constitution.'75 As evidence of the broad acceptance of the fusion of powers
exhibited by the Council of Revision, consider that the Chancellor of Equity of the
day-a member of the Council of Revision--did not object to the role of the
Council. 7 6 The Chancellor was the head of the New York Chancery Court, which
was a trial court whose jurisdiction,
in the British legal tradition, did not extend
77
beyond matters of equity. 1
The impetus for the Council was a "post-colonial distrust for the executive and
a widespread consensus that legislative supremacy was the surest guarantee of the
Revolution."'' 78 Once launched into service, the Council safeguarded minority rights
and interests, mitigated the abuse of legislative police powers, fostered private
enterprise, and eliminated punitive tax bills. 179 It also protected private rights from

167. william N. Eskridge, Jr., AllAbout Words: Early Understandingsofthe "JudicialPower" in Statutory
Interpretation,1776-1806, 101 COLuM. L. REV. 990, 1016 (2001).
168. Jonathan .Blake, Note, State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward: The Extraordinary
Application of ExtraordinaryWrits and OtherIssues; The Case That Never Should Have Been, 29 CAP. U. L. REV.
433,451 (2001).
169. John H. Langbein, ChancellorKent and the History of Legal Literature,93 COLuM. L. REV. 547,563
(1993).
170. N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. III.
171. J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, FourFacesof the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland,84
NW. U. L. REV. 437,444 (1990).

172. Michael B. Rappaport, The President'sVeto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 736, 782 n. 188
(1992).
173. N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. II.
174. James T. Barry HI, Comment, The Council of Revision and the Limits of JudicialPower, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 235, 245 (1989).
175. Robert M. Pitler, IndependentState Search and Seizure Constitutionalism:The New York State Court
of Appeals' Quest for PrincipledDecisionmaking,62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 35 n.116 (1996).
176. Harold J. Krent, Foreword: The Legacy of ChancellorKent, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3, 5 n. 12 (1998).
177. G. Edward White, The Chancellor'sGhost, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 229, 234 (1998).
178. John T. Buckley, The Governor-FromFigureheadto PrimeMinister:A HistoricalStudy of the New
York State Constitution and the Shift of Basic Power to the Chief Executive, 68 ALB. L. REV. 865, 871 (2005).
179.

1 FRANK W. PRESCOTr & JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE POLITICS OF THE VETO OF LEGISLATION IN NEW

YORK STATE 52 (1980).
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arbitrary and ill-advised state bills.' 80 Indeed, "[flar from being an impassable
barrier to good legislation, the element of compromise was omnipresent as testified
by passage of laws satisfactory to both sides after vetoes." '8 1 The Council of
Revision's review of legislation before its enactment effectively eliminated the need
for judicial review in New York.'82 The Council of Revision was abolished by
unanimous vote 83 at the New York Constitutional Convention of 1821184
Nevertheless, it was not until the New York Constitutional Convention of 1846 that
by judges instead of a body consisting of, among
final judicial appeals were heard
85
others, elected legislators.
The New York Constitution was something of a model against which the
delegates assembled to design the constitutional framework for the new republic
measured their own creation. 186 At the Constitutional Convention of 1787 in
Philadelphia, the framers proposed a national equivalent of the Council of
Revision-modeled on the New York Council 87-- on which members of the
executive and judiciary would sit in order to endorse or reject legislation before its
enactment. 8 The Council, it was proposed, would operate according to the
following rules: (1) it would be composed of the President of the United States and
the U.S. Supreme Court justices; (2) proposed bills could be vetoed by either the
President or the U.S. Supreme Court justices; (3) two thirds of both houses of
Congress were required to override either a presidential or judicial veto of the
were required to
proposed bill; and (4) three quarters of both houses of Congress
89
override a joint presidential-judicial veto of the proposed bill. 1
James Madison championed this proposal as an apparatus that would prevent
judicial invalidation of congressional legislation. 90 The founders viewed the
Council as an instrument to preserve constitutional limits.'9 1 The intent underlying
the Council was to make the judiciary politically accountable for its judgments
insofar as the judiciary would be bound, in its judgments, to respect the
180.

John F. Hart, Fish,Dams,andJames Madison:Eighteenth-CenturySpecies Protectionand the Original

Understandingof the Takings Clause, 63 MD. L. REV. 287, 305 n. 129 (2004) (quoting Letter from James Madison
to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 351 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E.
Rachal eds., 1973)).

181. PRESCOTr&ZIMMERMAN,supra note 179, at 52.
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interpretations of the Council of Revision.' 92 Madison also envisioned another
purpose for the Council: to remain abreast of state legislation and to advise
Congress of any state bills or laws that ran afoul of the federal government's vision
for the Union.193 The Council would stand guard over the nation as a dispassionate
state legislation before it could
umpire and defender of minority rights, vetoing
94
awaken factionalism in the several states. 1
Madison was troubled by the practice of judicial review because it stifled the
voice of the people.'9 5 He therefore urged the idea of the Council of Revision upon
his fellow delegates as a way to prevent the judiciary from being "paramount in fact
to the legislature, which was never intended, and can never be proper."'' 96 Indeed,
as Federalist James Wilson maintained, the Council was necessary because "[1laws
may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet may
not be so unconstitutional as tojustify the Judges in refusing to give them effect."' 97
Madison also recommended that a law that had been invalidated by the Council of
Revision could still survive-provided that it was repassed by a legislative
supermajority after a subsequent election. 98
The idea was ultimately rejected' 99-not once but four times 2 -each time
proposed by Madison,2 ° ' despite the strong backing of Madison20 2 and Wilson as
well as other influential statesmen like Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pinckney,2 °3
Roger Sherman, 2° Luther Martin, and George Mason. 2 5 The proposal was denied
repeatedly in large part because delegates to the Convention feared that the Council
would bring judges too close to the realm of policy making.2" Although AntiFederalist Elbridge Gerry viewed the Council as a way to keep judges within their
proper sphere-addressing matters of law and not public policy 2° 7-he nevertheless
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84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 599 (1984).
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Winter 2007]

CONSTITUTIONAL IMBALANCE

worried that seating judges on such a Council would make them feel and act like
statesmen rather than jurists. 208 Nathanial Gorham agreed, concurring with the
principle thatjudges cannot "be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge of the
mere policy of public measures. '"209
Delegates registered six general objections to the adoption of a national Council
of Revision: (1) the power of judges to assess the constitutionality of laws was an
adequate safeguard against possible legislative aggrandizement; (2) having
reviewed the constitutionality of legislation before it becomes law, judges would
be conflicted should the law later appear before them in a case or controversy; (3)
the power of the executive would be diminished; (4) the people, not the judiciary,
would stand watch over their own rights; (5) judges would have no expertise in
matters of policy; and (6) the Council would violate the separation of powers
doctrine.2" ° On this final point-the separation of powers-Madison and Wilson
appreciated the danger of fusing the executive and judicial powers into a Council
of Revision but nonetheless determined that the virtues of the proposed Council
outweighed the concerns occasioned by blending governmental functions.21'
The Founders' solicitude for the doctrine of separation of powers is evident in
their similar rejection of a Privy Council, which would have been comprised of the
executive department leaders and the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and
whose function would have been to advise the President.1 2 The delegates agreed at
least on this: the judiciary should act only in matters that were "judiciary" in
nature.213 Delegates were also attuned to the value of judicial independence, which
they feared might be compromised were judges to occupy a formal role in the
legislative process. 214 All options having been dutifully considered, the Convention
crafted and adopted the executive veto in place of the proposed Council.215
It is exceedingly important to underscore that the Convention's rejection-and
New York's abolition-of the Council is not effective ammunition for an argument
againstjudicial review. 216 Quite the contrary, these choices-to turn away from the
Council-are testimony to the decision in early America to embrace devices that

208. Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural-Law Originalism-OrWhy JusticeScalia (Almost) GetsIt Right, 20HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627, 647 (1997).
209. Rex E. Lee & Richard G. Wilkins, On Greatnessand ConstitutionalVision: Justice Byron R. White,
1994 BYU L. REV. 291, 309 n.99 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
210. Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of JudicialReview: A Pleafor New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031,
1058 (1997).
211. John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructureandJudicialDeference to Agency InterpretationsofAgency
Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 644 n.159 (1996).
212. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81
CORNELL L.REV. 393, 432 (1996).

213. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., ConstitutionalFlares:On Judges, Legislatures,and Dialogue, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1998).
214. Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the JudicialBranch in the New
Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L.REv. 31,46 (1998); Jonathan T. Molot, The JudicialPerspectivein the Administrative
State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary'sStructuralRole, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 49
(2000).
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Commissions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 993, 1003 n.53 (1986).
216. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 94 (1984).

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 37

would rein in the legislative branch.2" 7 It is equally noteworthy that both proponents
and opponents of the Council understood that the judiciary would possess the power
of judicial review."' But this authority was, and remains, bound by discernible
rules. For instance, federal courts must adhere to exacting standing requirements,2 19
as well as the constitutional rule prohibiting advisory opinions.22 ° Courts are also
subject to jurisdictional limits without which they would effectively operate as the
Council of Revision that was rejected long ago-a body that would have had the
power to review all legislation.22 ' Moreover, the judiciary may not invalidate a
congressional law within its jurisdiction on a whin---it may do so only when it can
articulate a reason why the law is unconstitutional.22 2 To be sure, the debates over
the Council of Revision suggest that judges were not intended to possess any
authority to invalidate an unwise, unpopular, or ill-conceived law so long as that
law did not contravene the Constitution.22 3 The judicial perimeter is therefore
unmistakable.
It is true that at least some of the Founders believed thatjudges should discharge
some extrajudicial function, unbound by the exacting separation of powers
doctrine.224 But the founding debates effectively foreclosed that avenue insofar as
they made clear the stakes involved in weighing the merits of the Council of
Revision: a vote in favor of the Council was a vote for judges to have the power to
invalidate laws on policy grounds.225 Walter Berns concurs and argues that the
Convention's decision not to adopt a Council of Revision for the new republic
demonstrates the intent of framers to deny the judiciary any role in matters of policy
and to limit judges to the constitutional text and its animating history.226 What we
learn from the debates of the Constitutional Convention is that the Founders
confined the judiciary to a reactive role, invalidating statutes only on grounds of

217. Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in PublicActions: Is It a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE L.J.
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221. Jules B. Gerard, Commentary, A Restrained Perspective on Activism, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605,
609-10 (1988).
222. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and ConstitutionalLegitimacy, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
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223. John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretationfrom the Constitution, 101 COLuM. L.
REV. 1648, 1667 n.90 (2001).
224. Jon C. Blue, A Well-Tuned Cymbal? ExtrajudicialPoliticalActivity, 18 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 1, 36
(2004).
225. John C. Eastman, JudicialReview of UnenumeratedRights: Does Marbury's HoldingApply in a PostWarren Court World?, 28 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 713, 718 (2005).
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unconstitutionality.22 7 The rejection of the Council of Revision was an express act
to deny judges a roving commission to shape the public policy of the new
republic.22 8 Most framers discarded the notion that judges should have a hand in
policy matters. 229 Broadly stated, then, the Council of Revision failed because the
Founders did not wish to impose external controls over the people and their
representatives. 230
Having reviewed the essential features of the colonial-era Council of Revision,
let us ask how such a Council might operate today to restore balance to the U.S.
Constitution. The evolution of the American judiciary into a dominant actor in
constitutional politics is a significant difference from the founding era, a difference
that may warrant establishing something similar in principle to the Council of
Revision. As Mark Tushnet has argued, the Fourteenth Amendment has made the
adoption of a Council of Revision more compatible with the modern contours of
federalism than would have been the case at the Constitutional Convention.23'
Another scholar argues that the failure to adopt the Council of Revision at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 is directly traceable
of a
• to "the development
,,12
kind ofjudiciary that is problematic in a representative democracy.
The principal
institutional concern with a modern incarnation of the Council of Revision is that
it would duplicate-and therefore dilute-the presidential veto power.233 But that
assumes that the composition of a modem Council of Revision would also include
the President, who would have been a member of the Madisonian Council of
Revision. Moreover, several modem-day Western liberal democracies-France,
Germany, Italy, and Spain-possess a constitutional analogue to the Council of
Revision.234
The late William Rehnquist, former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court,
once proposed that a modem Council of Revision should reflect some measure of
popular will insofar as its members should be elected or appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate.2 35 The function of the modem Council would be to
review congressional legislation before its enactment into law by presidential
signature pursuant to the Constitution.23 6 The Council would possess the power to
either invalidate the bill-on grounds of unconstitutionality-or return it to the
Congress with suggested amendments. A supermajority of both houses of the
Congress could trump the Council's decision to invalidate a bill. The effect of the
227. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 549, 585 (2002).
228. Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal
ConstitutionalLaw, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 702 (2000).
229. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation:John Marshall, James Wilson, and the Problem of
Reconciling PopularSovereignty and NaturalLaw Jurisprudencein the New FederalRepublic, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 113, 168-69 (2003).
230. Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1726-27 (1998).
231. Mark Tushnet, Politics,NationalIdentity,and the Thin Constitution,34 U. RICH. L,Rev. 545,556 n.45
(2000).
232. Ann Stuart Anderson, A 1787Perspectiveon SeparationofPowers, in SEPARATION OFPOWERS-DOES
IT STILL WORK? 138, 149 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986).
233. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatismand the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1363--64 (1988).
234. Leslie Friedman Goldstein, From Democracy toJuristocracy,38 LAw & SOc'Y REV. 611, 619 (2004).
235. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 698 (1976).
236. U.S. CONST. art. L § 7, cl.
2.
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Council's blessing of legislation would be to shield the law from invalidation at the
hands of the judiciary. Such legislation would effectively be judicial review-proof.
The judiciary would still retain its authority to interpret the Constitution, construe
legislation, and resolve disputes, but it would lose its power to invalidate duly
passed laws. This proposal, like the Council of Censors, would be consistent with
the three Bickellian principles of representative government, democratic legitimacy,
and popular will.237
C. The Legislative Override
Consider two additional options in the search for balance in the constitutional
process: (1) conferring upon the legislature an unqualified power to override
judicial invalidations of its statutes; or (2) conferring upon the legislature a
qualified power to override judicial invalidations of its statutes. The first option
represents a parliamentary supremacy in which the people, through the legislature,
retain determinative authority over the constitutionality of statutes. Let us call it
legislative sovereignty. Recognizing that the people-through their elected
representatives-should have the power to craft the laws that bind them, a
parliamentary supremacy holds that unelected and unaccountable judges cannot
defensibly be given the authority to nullify a duly passed statute infused with
democratic legitimacy that only a legislature acting properly can confer. This option
would restore democratic legitimacy to the American polity, as it would leave
matters of popular sovereignty to elected representatives and remove them from the
238
purview of what some observers regard as Platonic "philosopher kings
sometimes detached from the practical realities of managing the affairs of the state.
It is unclear whether Bickel would look favorably upon such a change. In his
discussion on the role of Congress, Bickel refers to British parliamentary supremacy
but does not give readers his assessment of its relative merits and demerits. 239 As for
the Federalist,its authors plainly disapprove of anything resembling an unqualified
legislative override: It is thejudiciary's duty, writes the Federalist,"[t]o declare all
acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. '240 Hamilton concedes
that judicial review is a controversial practice inasmuch as it appears to place the
judiciary above the legislature in the governmental hierarchy: "some perplexity
respecting the right of the courts to pronounce legislative acts void, because
contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would
imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power. 24' But, declares
Hamilton, "[i]t can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a
repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the
legislature. 2 4 2 Indeed, "[t]he courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they

237. See supra notes 109-118 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 833 (1999); Michael W.
McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudenceof Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 699; Anthony A.
Peacock, Response, Law, Courts, and American Culture, 29 VT. B.J. & L. DIG., Summer 2003, at 6, 8.
239. BICKEL, supra note 109, at 22.
240. THE FEDERALIST No.78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 41, at 438.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 440.
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should be disposed to exercise WILL instead ofJUDGMENT, the consequence would
equally be the substitution of their pleasure for that of the legislative body. 243 On
this point, Hamilton is correct. The judiciary must not exercise its will instead of
judgment, meaning that it must not supplant the will of the people with its own. But
Hamilton steers clear of squarely confronting the very real risk that has materialized
in the present day-that the judiciary would ever exercise its will instead of
judgment.
The second option-a qualified legislative override-is a Canadian innovation.
The Canadian qualified legislative override is known as the "Notwithstanding
Clause" and is enshrined in the CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms24-the
Canadian equivalent to the American Bill of Rights. Pursuant to the
Notwithstanding Clause, either the Federal Parliament or a provincial legislature
may adopt legislation to override fundamental civil and political freedoms
guaranteed in the Charter.24 5 The adopted legislation remains in place for up to five
years, at which time the enacting legislature may re-enact it indefinitely for
successive periods lasting up to five years. 246 The legislative body may use the
Clause in two ways. First, the body may use the Clause preemptively in anticipation
of objectionable legislation-for instance, in the case of a provincial legislature
invoking the Clause to neutralize legislation about to be passed by the Federal
Parliament.24 7 Second, the Clause may be used retrospectively to negate a judicial
decision.248 Perhaps the best way to conceptualize this qualified legislative override
is as an opt-out provision by which Parliament or any of the provincial equivalents
may opt-out of or suspend the application of a judicial decree in their respective
jurisdictions for renewable periods of up to five years. 249 The purpose of this
override clause, as expressed by the Minister of Justice of the day, "is to provide the
rather than judges have the
flexibility that is required to ensure that legislatures
250
final say on important matters of public policy.
The Notwithstanding Clause derives from the theory of parliamentary supremacy,
which Canada inherited from its British forefathers.25' Canadian parliamentary
supremacy has always been qualified by constitutional or conventional limitations,

243. Id. (emphasis added).
244. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) § 33.
245. For instance, such fundamental freedoms include freedom of expression, conscience, association, and
assembly; freedom from unreasonable search and seizure; and the right to equality. But some rights are unassailable
under the Canadian Constitution, including democratic, education, and mobility rights. See id.
246. Id. § 33(3) (providing that an override "shall cease to have effect five years after it comes into force or
on such earlier date as may be specified in the declaration").
247. See Jason Murphy, Note, Dialogic Responses to M. v. H.: From Compliance to Defiance, 59 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 299, 309-12 (2001) (discussing preemptive use of the Clause by the Alberta legislature).
248. Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty: JudicialReview, Legislative Supremacy, and Federalism
in the Constitutional Traditionsof Canadaand the United States, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1267.
249. See Nadia Ahmad, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An Example of Canadian
Dependence on the United States or Commitment to InternationalLaw, 7 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 89, 91-92 (1998);
Jeffrey L. Friesen, Note, The Distributionof Treaty-Implementing Powersin ConstitutionalFederations:Thoughts
on the American and CanadianModels, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1415, 1445 (1994).
250. DAVID JOHANSEN & PHILIP ROSEN, PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH BRANCH, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT,
THE NOTWITHSTANDING CLAUSE OF THE CHARTER 7-8 (Library of Parliament) (rev. ed. May 2005).
251. Robert A. Sedler, ConstitutionalProtection of Individual Rights in Canada:The Impact of the New
CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1191, 1233-34 (1984).
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namely federalism and the distribution of discrete functions between Parliament and
the several provincial equivalents.252 But the Clause adds a novel twist to the theory
of parliamentary supremacy. It embodies a political compromise between traditional
principles of parliamentary supremacy and the model of constitutionalism reflected
in the United States,253 between legislative sovereignty and judicial review,254 thus
situating Canada in an intermediate position between its British ancestor and
American neighbor.255 Specifically, the Notwithstanding Clause reconciles
parliamentary supremacy with the modem vanguard of entrenched rights. 6
Importantly, Parliament's authority to invalidate judicial decisions pursuant to the
Clause does not operate in the same way as it did under the prior Canadian rule of
parliamentary supremacy."'
Instead, this unique marriage has created what Canadian scholars have described
as a dialogue or a continuing exchange of thoughts and theories on constitutional
interpretation between the court and the legislature.2 5 Yet the dialogue extends
beyond these two parties. By upholding Canada's traditional respect for the
principle of parliamentary supremacy-while concurrently embracing a culture of
judicial review intended to safeguard basic rights and liberties retained by
Canadians, subject only to an extraordinary action on the part of the people through
the legislature-the Notwithstanding Clause not only cultivates dialogue between
both the legislature and the judiciary but also between the legislature and the
people.2 9 The result is the promotion of the important principle of democratic
inclusion,26 which ensures that the court can neither chill nor preempt public
discourse on matters that have yet to find resolution, or even yet to face substantive
deliberation and debate, among the people. This is the very essence of participatory
democracy.
Yet the Notwithstanding Clause has been all but abandoned by politicians.261
Legislatures have invoked the Notwithstanding Clause only seventeen times since
its inception.262 According to one scholar, the Clause has been consigned to

252. Yoav Dotan, The Spillover Effect of Bills of Rights: A ComparativeAssessment of the Impactof Bills
of Rights in Canadaand Israel, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 293, 297 (2005).
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256. Tushnet, supra note 119, at 279.
257. A. Wayne MacKay, The Legislature, the Executive and the Courts:The DelicateBalance of Poweror
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(1997) (discussing the theory of institutional dialogue).
259. See Tsvi Kahana, Understandingthe NotwithstandingMechanism, 52 U. TORONTO L.J., Spring 2002,

at 221,260 n. 108 (stating that dialogue occurs not only between the legislature and the judiciary, but also between
the legislature and the people).
260. Julie Debeljak, Rights Protection Without JudicialSupremacy: A Review ofthe CanadianandBritish
Models of Bills of Rights, 26 MELB. U. L. REv. 285, 322 (2002).
261. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, JudicialReview, LegislativeOverride,and Democracy,38 WAKE FOREST L. REv.

451, 466-69 (2003).
262. Canadian legislatures have summoned the Notwithstanding Clause in such contexts as language, labor,
marriage, education, pension, and agriculture. See Barbara Billingsley, Section 33: The Charter's Sleeping Giant,
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permanent illegitimacy and is unlikely to resurrect into a viable constitutional
instrument of popular choice.26 3 Comparative constitutionalist Mark Tushnet
suggests two reasons why the Notwithstanding Clause remains on the shelf, unused
by political actors. First, the Canadian legislative process contains a number of
"veto points," or discrete sites along the lawmaking timeline, at which an engaged
minority can cripple legislative efforts before they even become matters of public
discourse.2 6 Second, using the Clause in a retrospective fashion comes at a great
political cost to the enacting legislature, which must effectively say to the public
that it will violate a right that the court has said that they possess as a matter of
constitutional law. 265 This latter point is echoed by Kent Roach, who argues that the
reluctance of legislatures to invoke the Clause is a failure of governmental and
public will. 266 But it may more accurately represent the degeneration of the
Canadian political process into what one observer has called "judicial
trumping"--courts arrogating to themselves the last word in the inter-branch
institutional dialogue-and not the failure of legislatures to revise, reverse, or
override judicial decisions.267 Whatever the reason for its disfavor in Canada, the
Notwithstanding Clause may reflect an antiquated notion of Canadian parliamentary
supremacy that has been supplanted by a model better described as constitutional
supremacy.26 8
It may be helpful to understand precisely what is at stake in the Notwithstanding
Clause by exploring the first and only circumstance under which it was invoked in
direct response to a judicial decision. Subsequent to a Canadian Supreme Court
decision invalidating a ban on non-French language on commercial signs, 269 the
Quebec provincial government responded by invoking the Notwithstanding Clause
to override the decision.270 Under Quebec's countering legislation, the provincial
legislature suspended the application of the Canadian Supreme Court's decision in
the province of Quebec. 271 The provincial government announced that it would
reverse thejudgment of the supreme court, thereby making it lawful to do in Quebec
just what the supreme court had forbidden: to ban the use of non-French languages
on commercial signs.2 72 I define this option as a "qualified" legislative override
because the legislative effect is not indefinite, as it would be under the first option
of legislative sovereignty. Once it is invoked by a legislature, the qualified override

21 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 331, 339-41 (2002).
263. F.L. Morton, CanJudicialSupremacy Be Stopped?, POL'Y OPTIONS, Oct. 2003, at 25, 28-29 (arguing
that the Clause cannot be resurrected at the federal level but proposing a plan to resurrect it at the provincial level).
264. Mark Tushnet, New Forms of JudicialReview and the Persistenceof Rights- andDemocracy-Based
Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 833-34 (2003).
265. Id. at 819, 825.
266. KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE 175
(2001).

267. Mary Liston, Willis, 'Theology,' and the Rule of Law, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 767, 785-86 (2005).
268. See GERALD L. GALL, THE CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 95 (1995); see also Frank lacobucci, The
Supreme Court of Canada:Its History, Powersand Responsibilities,4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 27, 31 (2002)
("As such, constitutional supremacy, rather than parliamentary supremacy, now characterized the Canadian legal
and constitutional landscape.").
269. Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R, 712.
270. JOHANSEN & ROSEN, supra note 250, at 10.
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would remain in place for up to only five years, after which it would expire unless
the enacting legislature deemed it necessary, as a matter of popular sovereignty, to
extend the law.
Although the Notwithstanding Clause in Canada "provides a cushion, a comfort
zone to which there can be a retreat when the balance in the partnership seems to
lean too far towards the courts,"2'73 it is unlikely to help resettle the constitutional
balance in the United States. The qualified legislative override is perhaps much less
palatable in the United States than it is in Canada. Consider the consequences of a
qualified legislative override. A number of southern states may have invoked this
override to suspend the application of the U.S. Supreme Court'sjudgment in Brown
2 74
v. Board of Education,
as may have been the case for northern states in Dred
275
Scott v. Sandford, thus leading to a troubling fragmentation of the American
polity.
Bickel and the Federalistwould come to divergent conclusions on the use of
such a qualified override. Bickel would find virtue in the qualified override. True,
Bickel' s Least DangerousBranch embraces a role for the Court in advancing social
change. For instance, Bickel viewed Brown as a celebration of the role of the
Court.276 Nevertheless, Bickel questioned the propriety ofjudicial policymaking and
judicial review. This is precisely what the Notwithstanding Clause aims to temper.
Indeed, as Guido Calabresi has observed, the Canadian Constitution is "a wonderful
' Thus, Bickel is likely to have
example of an essentially Bickellian constitution."277
looked favorably upon the qualified override as a solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty that he observed in the American polity.
On the other hand, the Federalistsuggests that the qualified override would not
have been well received. Hamilton brandished as his lynchpin the "necessity" of
uniformity in national law. Consider his words: "The mere necessity of uniformity
in the interpretation of the national laws decides the question. Thirteen independent
courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a
hydra in government from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can
' Madison further suggested the imprudence
proceed."278
of adopting a qualified
legislative override in his discussion of the Lycian confederacy and the Achaean
league: "[W]e know that the ruin of one of them proceeding from the incapacity of
the federal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the
subordinate authorities. 279
Nonetheless, the theory underpinning the Notwithstanding Clause is promising.
As political theorist Michael Perry has observed, the Clause offers "an opportunity
for a deliberative judicial consideration of a difficult and perhaps divisive human
rights issue and an opportunity for electorally accountable officials to respond, in

273. Patricia Hughes, Section 33 of the Charter:What's the Problem, Anyway? (Or, Why a Feminist Thinks
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276. See BICKEL, supra note 109, at 244-72.
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278. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 41, at 446.
279. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), supranote 41, at 294.
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the course of ordinary politics, in an effective way."28 The process of dialogue
between the legislature and the people raises the possibility of initiating "some
process, more reasoned than court-packing and more accessible than constitutional
amendment, through which the justice and wisdom of [extremely questionable
judicial] decisions can be publicly discussed and possibly rejected. ' 28 The dialogue
fostered between the popularly elected branch and the people is more than mere
window dressing-the possibility of a legislative override of judicial decision
brings with it the prospect of "rich democratic debate, 282 characterized by focused
and informed public political discussion.283 In this respect, the qualified legislative
override permits the popularly elected branch to do what it does best, which is to
consider, weigh, and implement polymorphic matters of policy that are beyond the
institutional aptitudes of the judiciary.2 4
V. CONCLUSION
As Alexis de Tocqueville once observed, "There is hardly a political question in
the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one."2 5 The
story of the American judiciary's increasing power has been a tale about the
corresponding decline of the theory of legislative supremacy.2 86 The first state
governments in the United States believed deeply in legislative sovereignty and the
notion that the legislature was "the chief organ of the popular will. ' 28 7 The gavel of
the court was subordinate to the voice of the people, as expressed through the
legislature. 288 At the Constitutional Convention, delegates agreed that the power to
make the law should be distinct from the power to expound on it. 289 Thus, Charles
Black reasoned that, at the founding, "[t]he function of the judges was thus placed
in sharpest antithesis to that of the legislator," who, in contrast to the judge, should
reflect on "what the law ought to be." 29
How far the judiciary has come. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has itself
acknowledged that it is not a "super-legislature ' 291' and has accepted that it should
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not discharge a policymaking role,292 its modem history proves otherwise. It may
be necessary to remind the American people that "[t]he supreme power is in the
' That
people, and rulers possess only that portion which is expressly given them."293
is precisely why "a general presumption that rulers will govern well is not a
'
sufficient security."294
The constitutional balance between the people and the
respective branches of the government requires that the people assert themselves
when they see choices about their lives made by those who are immune from any
consequence. The American people must remember that "[t]he body of the people,
principally, bear the burdens of the community; they of right ought to have a
controul in its important concerns, both in making and executing the laws, otherwise
' As Kermit
they may, in a short time, be ruined."295
Roosevelt wrote in compelling
fashion to his fellow Americans, "We must not lose sight of the fact that it is not
just a Constitution the Court is expounding. It is our Constitution, and judges can
no more sever
its application from popular understanding than they can tell us who
296
we are."
The options surveyed in the previous Part-the Councils of Censors and
Revision, and the legislative override-appear to offer unsatisfactory solutions to
the problem of judicial ingress into the public square. In theory, each may be a
constructive solution to the existing American constitutional imbalance. Each
device canvassed above-particularly the Councils of Censors and Revision-holds
great promise for popular engagement in the American judicial and political
processes. Moreover, these devices may help defuse or dampen national tensions
that appear on the heels of controversial judicial decisions. But in practice, these
devices would likely fail. As a practical matter, entrenched political interests are
likely to intervene to prevent such a substantial political restructuring of thejudicial
process. Although the three mechanisms above generally adhere to the three
principles against which Bickel measured the advisability of a recalibration of
constitutional power-representative government, democratic legitimacy, and
popular wil1 29 7-several problems are likely to stand in the way of such reforms.
First, these new judicial controls in the American polity would require a
constitutional amendment, and any constitutional amendment is of course difficult
to pass.298 Yet, even assuming a sponsor of these reforms could muster the requisite
292. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) ("Under our constitutional framework,
federal courts do not sit as councils of revision, empowered to rewrite legislation in accord with their own
conceptions of prudent public policy."); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) ("It is up to legislatures,
not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation."); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399
(1937) ("Even if the wisdom of the policy be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legislature
is entitled to its judgment.").
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popular support to pass an amendment, legislators are likely to view both the
Councils of Censors and Revision as intrusions upon their own powers and
preeminence in Washington.299 More fundamentally, these mechanisms would
require rethinking the American Constitution on a large scale. Even if one could
conceive of a constitutional amendment that would find support from all necessary
constituencies, an amendment instituting any of the tools described above would
trigger other domino-effect amendments to the Constitution.3 "° This is not an
appetizing prospect.
Therefore, in brainstorming how to properly superintend the Court's mounting
disproportionate influence, perhaps the answer lies not in expanding the powers of
the people through popular or legislative institutions-as the three models described
above propose-but instead in limiting the reach of the judiciary. Any such strategy
would have to address the two principal ways in which courts normally exceed their
prudent role: (1) federal judicial invalidations of statutes in a manner that reflects
Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty; and (2) judicial excursions like Roe and
Bush v. Gore, °1 the latter effectively reducing the Electoral College from a body of
designated state electors to an arbitrary nine-person electorate. Neither Roe nor
Bush invalidated congressional statutes, yet they nevertheless strike observers as
improper entries into the political process.3 °2 These two cases induce discomfort in
Americans concerned with participatory democracy and the integrity of the political
process, the first because the Court cast itself as a super-legislature in issuing an
opinion that reads like a statute,3 °3 and the second because the Court blocked the
Congress from discharging its constitutionally-and statutorily--delegated function
as referee in mediating disputes in electoral contests.
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For an instructive look at what more closely resembles the proper judicial role
in an American participatory democracy, we may turn to political theorist Cass
Sunstein, who has articulated in persuasive fashion his apprehension of the
judiciary's swelling silhouette over the American political process at the expense
of the people through the legislature. 5 Sunstein urges the judiciary to "proceed[]
in a way that is catalytic rather than preclusive, and that is closely attuned to the fact
that courts are participants in an elaborate system of democratic deliberation.""3 6
Sunstein unveils his theory ofjudicial minimalism, which holds that "sometimes the
best decision is [for judges] to leave things undecided""3 7 with a few cautionary
words for the judiciary: "When a democracy is in a state of ethical or political
uncertainty, courts may not have the best or the final answers.""3 8 Indeed, declares
Sunstein, "[j]udicial answers
may be wrong" or "[t]hey may be counterproductive
' 3°
even if they are right.
In the context of these pages, the relevance of judicial minimalism is its promise
to "promote democratic goals, not simply by leaving things undecided but also by
allowing opinion to coalesce over time and by spurring processes of democratic
deliberation."3 0 Sunstein describes his theory of judicial minimalism in the
following passage:
A minimalist court settles the case before it, but it leaves many things undecided.
It is alert to the existence of reasonable disagreement in a heterogeneous society.
It knows that there is much that it does not know; it is intensely aware of its own
limitations. It seeks to decide cases on narrow grounds. It avoids clear rules and
final resolutions. Alert to the problem of unanticipated consequences, it sees
itself as part of a system of democratic deliberation; it attempts to promote the
democratic ideals of participation, deliberation, and responsiveness. It allows
continued space for democratic reflection from Congress and the states.311
Sunstein's laudatory objective is to revive and sustain a culture of deliberative
democracy. The practice of judging, according to Sunstein, should reflect a
philosophy of "democracy-promoting minimalism," an ambitious model that
"require[s] deliberative judgments by democratically accountable bodies '312 and
"trigger[s] or improve[s] processes of democratic deliberation [by] provid[ing]
spurs and prods to promote democratic deliberation itself. ' 3 13 This measured
approach to discharging the solemn judicial function furthers the liberal democratic
values of democratic accountability and judicial reason-giving and prevents
"excessive judicial intervention into political domains. 3 14
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To illuminate his conception of judicial minimalism, Sunstein calls upon the
seminal case Roe v. Wade. He argues that the Court ventured beyond its modest
judicial role in advancing an elaborate trimester system and a complex body of rules
and standards.315 Sunstein argues that a minimalist judge would have issued one of
two moderate and democracy-promoting judgments: "the state may not forbid a
woman from having an abortion in a rape case" or "a state may not ban all abortions
' These two options for a minimalist ruling
in all circumstances."316
in Roe-which
"would have left the details undecided, to be filled in, at least in the first instance,
by lower courts and democratic judgments" 3 17-would have reflected the best
intentions of democracy-promoting minimalism and, as a consequence, would have
contributed to restoring popular participation and deliberation in the United States.
It is terribly important to stress that Sunstein makes no claim about whether Roe
was rightly or wrongly decided as a matter of constitutional law. His concern lies
with the process. As he writes, "at least it seems reasonable to think that the
democratic process would have done much better with the abortion issue if the
Court had proceeded more cautiously and in a humbler and more interactive
way."3t8 Thus, according to Sunstein, the popular function of the judiciary in the
American polity is to play a catalytic role in resolving important socio-legal issues
of the day. Answers to the great questions of political morality must not come from
the judiciary but rather from the dialogue and interchange in democratic politics.3 19
Sunstein' s theory ofjudicial minimalism straddles the delicate median separating
an aggressive policy of judicial review and a pervasive rule of legislative
sovereignty. Bickel would very likely look favorably upon Sunstein's judicial
minimalism as it appears to map very comfortably onto Bickel's vision for the
Court, which is to adopt a posture that "might help to set in motion the process of
political decision. 32 ° Indeed, judicial minimalism offers an appealing resolution to
Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty insofar as judicial minimalism does not
propose to palliate the existing constitutional imbalance in the United States-in
which the judiciary rules-by impulsively shifting governmental powers from one
branch to another, only to create another equally irrational imbalance-in which,
for example, the legislature would predominate.
Recognizing that America is neither a congressional supremacy nor a judicial
supremacy but more precisely a constitutional supremacy, judicial minimalism
places the burden to restore balance to the American polity squarely upon the
judicary. This responsibility calls on the judiciary to exercise self-restraint in
conceding that certain matters are better left for resolution by the people through
the elected branches of government. This, in turn, triggers a didactic process of
democratically accountable deliberation in the public square by and among the
people. Judicial minimalism negates the prospect of judges inappropriately
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interjecting themselves in the public discourse or imposing their unrepresentative
and unaccountable views on the people by invalidating duly passed congressional
statutes on anything other than narrow grounds. This resonates with the sentiment
that "the Court that writes broadly usurps the basically legislative function of
proscribing law."32 1
Nevertheless, as appealing as judicial minimalism may be to those who wish to
return the Constitution to the people themselves, history has abidingly demonstrated
that the American judiciary may not be willing to embrace a culture of minimalism.
One need not look any further than Roe and Bush to confirm that the judiciary
considers itself the peerless keeper of the constitutional score. These two now
mythical decisions are noteworthy. Unlike liberals and conservatives who generally
view these cases through conflicting lenses-liberals typically applaud and
conservatives usually decry Roe, while the reverse is generally true of Bush-I
stand not on political ideology but instead on political theory to regard each as
equally objectionable as the other. If such judicial decisions have taught Americans
anything it is that the American judiciary-unabashed by continuing criticisms of
its role among the three branches of government-has often displaced popular will
and declined to exercise restraint in the service of participatory democracy and civic
engagement. Even in its modern conservative incarnation. Just ask Al Gore.
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